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Inner speech has been shown to vary in form along several dimensions. Along
condensation, condensed inner speech forms have been described, that are supposed
to be deprived of acoustic, phonological and even syntactic qualities. Expanded forms,
on the other extreme, display articulatory and auditory properties. Along dialogality, inner
speech can be monologal, when we engage in internal soliloquy, or dialogal, when we
recall past conversations or imagine future dialogs involving our own voice as well as that
of others addressing us. Along intentionality, it can be intentional (when we deliberately
rehearse material in short-term memory) or it can arise unintentionally (during mind
wandering). We introduce the ConDialInt model, a neurocognitive predictive control
model of inner speech that accounts for its varieties along these three dimensions.
ConDialInt spells out the condensation dimension by including inhibitory control at the
conceptualization, formulation or articulatory planning stage. It accounts for dialogality,
by assuming internal model adaptations and by speculating on neural processes
underlying perspective switching. It explains the differences between intentional and
spontaneous varieties in terms of monitoring. We present an fMRI study in which we
probed varieties of inner speech along dialogality and intentionality, to examine the
validity of the neuroanatomical correlates posited in ConDialInt. Condensation was
also informally tackled. Our data support the hypothesis that expanded inner speech
recruits speech production processes down to articulatory planning, resulting in a
predicted signal, the inner voice, with auditory qualities. Along dialogality, covertly
using an avatar’s voice resulted in the activation of right hemisphere homologs of the
regions involved in internal own-voice soliloquy and in reduced cerebellar activation,
consistent with internal model adaptation. Switching from first-person to third-person
perspective resulted in activations in precuneus and parietal lobules. Along intentionality,
compared with intentional inner speech, mind wandering with inner speech episodes
was associated with greater bilateral inferior frontal activation and decreased activation
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in left temporal regions. This is consistent with the reported subjective evanescence
and presumably reflects condensation processes. Our results provide neuroanatomical
evidence compatible with predictive control and in favor of the assumptions made in the
ConDialInt model.
Keywords: inner speech, auditory verbal imagery, mind wandering, condensation, dialogality, intentionality, fMRI,
predictive control
INTRODUCTION
Three Dimensions of Inner Speech
Inner language can be defined as the subjective experience
of verbalization in the absence of overt articulation or sign
(Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015). It can be produced
independently of overt speech. It contributes to enriching
and shaping our inner existence and is instrumental in the
maintenance of a coherent self-narrative (Perrone-Bertolotti
et al., 2014; Lœvenbruck, 2018). Given the scarcity of data
on inner sign language production (but see e.g., Max, 1937;
McGuire et al., 1997; MacSweeney et al., 2008 and references
in Lœvenbruck et al., 2018) the present article is restricted to
the description of inner speech, although most of the theoretical
principles we endorse presumably also apply to inner sign.
The cognitive functions (or rather uses) of inner speech
have been investigated by means of introspective questionnaires
and behavioral methods, in typical and atypical populations
(for reviews, see e.g., Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014; Alderson-
Day and Fernyhough, 2015; Martínez-Manrique and Vicente,
2015; Alderson-Day et al., 2018; and the volume edited
by Langland-Hassan and Vicente, 2018). Previous works
suggest that inner speech plays an important role in many
cognitive operations, including working memory (Baddeley,
1992; Marvel and Desmond, 2012), autobiographical and
prospective memory (Meacham, 1979; Conway, 2005; Morin
and Hamper, 2012; Pavlenko, 2014), orientation and spatial
reasoning (Loewenstein and Gentner, 2005), mental arithmetics
(Sokolov, 1972), executive control (Emerson and Miyake, 2003;
Laurent et al., 2016), complex problem solving (Sokolov, 1972;
Baldo et al., 2005, 2015), and theory of mind judgment
(Newton and de Villiers, 2007). It has also been considered
that inner speech serves metacognitive functions. By making
our thoughts auditorily salient (in expanded varieties of covert
speech, see below), inner speaking makes us aware of our
thinking processes and allows us to focus our attention on
our thoughts and activities. This metacognitive ability in turn
contributes to our taking perspectives on self and others
and to generate self-knowledge. It has thus been suggested
that inner speech fosters metacognition (Vygotsky, 1934/1986;
Carruthers, 2002; Clark, 2002; Martínez-Manrique and Vicente,
2010; Jackendoff, 2011; Langland-Hassan et al., 2017), self-
regulation and self-motivation (Hardy, 2006; Clowes, 2007),
and self-awareness (Peirce, 1934; Vygotsky, 1934/1986; Ricœur,
1990; Dennett, 1991; Merleau-Ponty, 1948/2002; Wiley, 2006b;
Morin et al., 2011; Wilkinson and Fernyhough, 2017). This
diversity of uses comes with a plurality of forms. It has been
suggested that inner speech varies along several dimensions
(McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough, 2011). This article seeks to
provide an integrative description of these dimensions, which
accounts for the occurrence of various inner speech forms.
A first dimension along which inner speech can vary is
condensation. Overt speech production is classically viewed
as involving three main stages: conceptualization, formulation
and articulation (e.g., Dell, 1986, 2013; Bock, 1987; Kempen
and Hoenkamp, 1987; Levelt, 1989). Conceptual preparation
consists in planning an utterance’s meaning and purpose. The
preverbal message that results can be described as highly
condensed in form. Formulation translates the condensed
preverbal message delivered by the conceptualizer into a
linguistic structure. Formulation includes prosodic, syntactic and
morpho-phonological encoding. It ends up in the sketching
of a phonetic goal (or plan), expressed in a less condensed
(semi-expanded) form. The articulation stage follows, consisting
of articulatory planning, then execution, with full elaboration
and expansion. Covert speech has been conceived of as
truncated overt speech, but the stage at which the production
process is interrupted is still debated. According to some
scholars, inner language predominantly pertains to semantics
and is unconcerned with phonological, phonetic, articulatory
or auditory representations (see e.g., Vygotsky, 1934/1986;
MacKay, 1992; Oppenheim and Dell, 2008, 2010). Vygotsky,
for instance, claims that syntax in inner speech is maximally
simplified and can be elliptical, with the omission of words
and an extreme condensation of meaning. In his view, inner
speech, is highly predicated, in the sense that only the necessary
information is supplied. In line with Vygotsky’s view that inner
speech precedes word-level formulation, Knobloch (1984, p. 230,
cited by Friedrich, 2001), posits that inner language is the
preliminary form of all overt language utterances. It is the
mechanism by which quasi-linguistic material are supplied to
semantico-syntactic processes, in a “condensed, compact and
indicative form.” In this view, inner speech can therefore be
conceived of as the conceptual message, cast in a pre-linguistic
compact form, before formulation and articulatory planning
take place. Bergounioux (2001, p. 120) likewise states that
inner speech generally employs asyndeton (the omission of
coordinating conjunctions), anaphora (the use of expressions
whose interpretations depend on the context) and predication
(the use of expressions in which only the predicate, not the
subject, is formulated). In the same vein, Wiley (2006a) argues
that the “syntax of inner speech is abbreviated and simplified”
(p. 321) and that its semantics is also condensed, with fewer
words used relative to overt language, given that key words
may be used, that carry “large numbers of words or their
possible meanings” (p. 323). These introspective observations
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of condensation are supported by several psycholinguistic
experiments on the relative rates of overt and covert speech
(e.g., Korba, 1990; but see Netsell et al., 2016) or on the
different biases exhibited by speech slips in overt and covert
modes (Oppenheim and Dell, 2008, 2010; but see Corley et al.,
2011). These empirical findings suggest that, compared with
overt public speech, inner language is sketchy and can be
viewed as abbreviated or condensed, at the syntactic, lexical,
and even phonological levels. Such condensation implies that the
formulation and articulation stages may be suppressed or limited
in inner language.
An alternative view is that inner speech is a simulation of overt
speech production, encompassing all its stages, only interrupted
prior to motor execution. In this view, inner speech entails
phonological and articulatory specification and is associated
with the subjective experience of a voice percept (see e.g.,
Postma and Noordanus, 1996; Corley et al., 2011; Scott et al.,
2013). Several empirical arguments for the proposition that
inner speech involves multisensory representations, together
with the recruitment of the speech motor system, are provided
in Lœvenbruck et al. (2018). These include psycholinguistic data,
such as the verbal transformation effect (Reisberg et al., 1989;
Smith et al., 1995; Sato et al., 2004) as well as electromyographical
findings (McGuigan and Dollins, 1989; Nalborczyk et al., 2017)
and neuroimaging data (Lœvenbruck et al., 2005; Perrone-
Bertolotti et al., 2012; Yao et al., 2012; Vercueil and Perrone-
Bertolotti, 2013; Kell et al., 2017). These data, in turn, suggest that
inner speech may well possess many of the properties of overt
speech, including its articulatory specification.
These two views can be reconciled if various degrees
of unfolding of inner speech are considered. Building on
the Vygotskian’s view of inner speech as the outcome of a
developmental process, Fernyhough (2004, see also Geva et al.,
2011; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015) has suggested that
inner speech varies between two extremes. The first one, which
he calls “expanded inner speech,” is claimed to correspond to
an early developmental stage of inner speech, which (according
to Vygotsky, 1934/1986) is an internalization of overt dialog
and which includes turn-taking qualities as well as syntactic,
lexical and phonological properties. The other extreme, referred
to as “condensed inner speech,” is argued to correspond to
Vygotsky (1934/1986) description of the latest developmental
form of inner speech, which has lost most of the acoustic
and structural qualities of overt speech. Fernyhough (2004) has
suggested that inner speech varies with cognitive demands and
emotional conditions between these two extreme forms. A similar
position is taken by Vicente and Martínez-Manrique (2016), who
conceive of unsymbolized thinking (as described by Hurlburt
et al., 2013) as the most condensed form of inner speech and as
in continuity with expanded forms of inner speech. Therefore,
the two views of inner speech (abbreviation vs. simulation)
can be construed as descriptions of two opposite poles on
the condensation dimension. The fully condensed form only
involves the highest linguistic level (semantics), and has lost
most of the acoustic, phonological and even syntactic qualities
of overt speech. Expanded inner speech, on the other hand,
presumably engages all linguistic levels down to articulatory
planning and the perception of an inner voice. It retains many
of the phonological and phonetic properties of overt speech.
Between the fully condensed form (preverbal message) and the
expanded articulation-ready form, it can be assumed that various
semi-condensed forms may exist, depending on the level at which
the speech production process is truncated.
A second dimension is dialogality. As argued by Fernyhough
(2004) or Jones and Fernyhough (2007a), inner speech may be
considered as “irreducibly dialogic,” in that it results from a
gradual process of internalization of dialogs, in which differing
perspectives on the world are held and self-regulated (but see
Gregory, 2017 for a slightly different view). In the Vygotskian
developmental approach taken by Fernyhough, a child’s first
utterances are set within external dialogs with their caregivers.
Later in development, the utterances remain dialogic, with the
child overtly producing both questions and answers, in an
egocentric fashion (private speech, speech directed toward the
self). In the last developmental stage, these dialogs become
fully internalized into inner speech. Yet, even though self-
directed speech may become fully internalized, Fernyhough
(2004) claims that it retains the dialogic character of overt
dialog, with the ability to hold differing attitudes or views on
reality. In French pragmatics, a distinction is made between
dialogal discourse in which two distinct speakers are involved, in
an interpersonal way, and dialogic discourse, where two points
of view are confronted (for the distinction between dialogic
and dialogal, see Roulet, 1984; Bres, 2005; Roulet and Green,
2006). Dialogal discourse occurs in a communicative interaction
whereas dialogic discourse occurs in a reflexive argumentation.
An overt discourse can be “monologal dialogic,” when it is
uttered by one speaker who, asserts, refutes, questions. In
other words, it can be an argumented soliloquy. A discourse
can also be “dialogal monologic,” when two speakers convey
a single view, with no alternative. It can then be described
as a unitary conversation (Maingueneau, 2016). Although it
may be considered that inner speech is dialogic in content,
since multiple perspectives can be entertained internally, we
claim that it can be either monologal (soliloquial) or dialogal
in form. Monologal inner speech occurs when we engage in
internal soliloquy. In monologal situations, we can use our
own voice or we can also covertly imitate someone speaking,
which means we can produce internal soliloquy in another
person’s voice, yet we primarily are the speaker (although
obviously also the listener), and only one voice is controlled
and monitored. Dialogal inner speech occurs when we imagine
hearing someone, what is often referred to as auditory verbal
imagery (Shergill et al., 2001). In dialogal situations, when
we imagine someone talking to us, with their own voice, we
primarily are the addressee (although perhaps also the speaker).
This happens for instance when we recollect past dialogs or
when we practice future conversations. Dialogal inner speech
involves the representation and monitoring of our own voice
as well as those of other people. It also sometimes requires
the ability to entertain differing perspectives (Fernyhough, 2004;
Jones and Fernyhough, 2007a). Therefore, we claim that inner
speech can vary between two extremes: internal monolog or
soliloquy – i.e., inner speaking using own voice (“Self ”) – and
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internal dialog, which includes inner speaking and imagining
others speaking with their voices (“Self and Other”). Imitative
soliloquy, or monolog with another voice as one’s own, can
be conceived of as lying between these two extremes. Our
model seeks to account for these three distinct situations: inner
speaking as self, inner speaking as modified self, inner speaking
as self and other.
A third dimension is intentionality. We sometimes
deliberately engage in inner speech (when we rehearse material
in short-term memory), what can be called willful or intentional
inner speech. Other times, we find ourselves unintentionally
using inner language, what has been called verbal mind
wandering (Perrone-Bertolotti et al., 2014) or spontaneously
occurring inner speech (Hurlburt et al., 2016). Verbal mind
wandering has been described as evanescent, fading (Egger, 1881;
Saint-Paul, 1892; Hurlburt, 2011; Smadja, 2018) and its auditory
qualities are often reported as fainter than that of intentional
inner speech (Lœvenbruck et al., 2018).
As depicted in Figure 1, inner speech can therefore vary
along condensation, dialogality and intentionality dimensions.
It can be assumed that the expanded forms most frequently
arise during intentional inner speech (verbal mind wandering is
often reported as fading and fleeting), but this is debatable, as
unintentional varieties with expanded, audible, forms have been
reported (Hurlburt, 2011).
Monitoring of Multidimensional Inner
Speech Varieties
The question of monitoring during inner speech is still an open
one. Overt language production relies on verbal self-monitoring,
a mechanism which allows us to control and regulate our
own language productions. We can detect errors or disruptions
from our initial language goals, and even correct for these
errors online, sometimes even before articulation takes place
(Levelt, 1983; Postma, 2000; Huettig and Hartsuiker, 2010). In
many psycholinguistic models of overt speech production (e.g.,
Laver, 1980; Levelt, 1989), errors are detected by monitoring
and parsing the phonetic plan, also called “inner speech,” prior
to articulation. In our view, as described above, inner speech
production is embedded in overt speech production. It engages
speech production mechanisms, which can be interrupted at
different stages, according to the degree of condensation. The
mechanisms by which errors can be anticipated online during
overt speech production are therefore engaged during inner
speech production. This implies that errors in inner speech
FIGURE 1 | Varieties of inner speech along condensation, dialogality, and intentionality dimensions. On the vertical condensation axis, the most condensed forms
(top box) only engage the highest linguistic level (semantics), whereas the most expanded forms engage all linguistic levels down to articulatory planning and the
perception of an inner voice (bottom box). On the dialogality dimension, inner speech can vary between two extremes: internal monolog or soliloquy with own voice
(“Self”) and internal dialog, which includes inner speaking and imagining others speaking with their voices (“Self and Other”). Monolog with another voice as one’s
own lies in between these two extremes. On the horizontal intentionality axis, inner speech can vary between verbal mind wandering, on the left, and intentional
inner speech, on the right.
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can be detected using these mechanisms. Introspective accounts
suggest indeed that inner speech itself can be monitored
(Bergounioux, 2001). Evidence for inner speech monitoring can
be found in psycholinguistic data. Studies of inner recitation
of tongue-twisters show that speech errors can be detected,
even in a covert mode (e.g., Dell and Repka, 1992; Nooteboom,
2005; Oppenheim and Dell, 2008, 2010; Corley et al., 2011).
The Verbal Transformation Effect (VTE) refers to the perceptual
phenomenon in which listeners report hearing a new speech
percept when an ambiguous stimulus is repeated rapidly
(Warren, 1961). It has been shown to also occur in a covert
mode (Reisberg et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1995; Sato et al.,
2004). These studies suggest that inner speech alterations can
be monitored, at least when participants are asked to do so.
The level at which inner slips are detected is debated, however.
Tongue-twister inner recitation studies suggest that errors are
detected at the phonological (formulation) level. Oppenheim
and Dell (2008; 2010), for instance, observed a lexical bias,
which reveals that phonological representations are monitored.
They found that the errors reported by the participants, when
covertly repeating tongue-twisters, tend to produce more words
than non-words (“reef” replaced by “leaf” is more likely than
“wreath” replaced by “leath”). In overt speech, in addition to
the lexical bias, a phonemic similarity effect is observed, i.e.,
a tendency for slips to involve similarly articulated phonemes
(“reef” slips more often to “leaf,” with /r/ and /l/ sharing
voicing and approximant features, than “beef,” with /r/ and
/b/ only sharing voicing). This effect relies on subphonemic,
articulatory representations. The covert speech errors reported
by the participants in Oppenheim and Dell’s experiments do
not exhibit this effect. These findings therefore suggest that
monitoring for errors occurs at the formulation stage, not at the
articulatory planning stage. Corley et al. (2011), however, did
observe a phonemic similarity effect in the errors reported by the
participants in their own tongue-twister recitation experiment.
This suggests that inner slips could in fact be detected at
the articulation planning level. In addition, research on covert
VTE has indicated that the effect is disrupted during auditory
interference, which suggests that auditory processes are engaged
during the search for VTE (Smith et al., 1995). Altogether these
studies suggest that intentional inner speech monitoring can at
least take place at the lower two linguistic levels, i.e., formulation
and articulatory planning. Beyond these levels, it is still an open
question whether inner speech monitoring may occur at the
conceptualization level. Studies of self-repairs in spontaneous
overt speech production show that speakers do monitor the
intended pre-verbal message for appropriateness (e.g., Levelt,
1983; Blackmer and Mitton, 1991). In the overt speaking mode,
monitoring seems therefore to occur during conceptualization.
In children’s private speech, which, as mentioned above, has been
argued to be a precursor to inner speech, self-repairs are also
present at the conceptualization level, as shown by occurrences
of re-wording or amending of utterances (e.g., Manfra et al.,
2016). Consequently, the feedback arrows in Figure 1 represent
the self-editing processes that may take place at all levels during
intentional inner speech, including conceptualization. However,
this monitoring may be less stringent than the one that operates
in the overt mode. As mentioned above, Egger (1881), Vygotsky
(1934/1986), Bergounioux (2004), or Wiley (2006a) claim that
inner speech only needs to be understood by ourselves, which
implies that we can be less distinct, that we can abbreviate inner
sentences and that we can even sometimes produce erroneous
forms, as long as meaning is preserved. Wiley (2006a, 2014)
proposed that the control processes in overt and covert modes
are different. In inner speech, efficiency rules prevail, so that
production can be sped up and economized. Linguistic rules are
therefore weakened and monitoring can be considered as more
lax in intentional inner speech than overt speech. As concerns
less intentional forms of inner speech, that occur during mind
wandering, to our knowledge, there are no studies showing
that monitoring mechanisms are at play. By definition, mind
wandering operates without executive control, or with only
intermittent control (but see Smallwood et al., 2012). In the
present paper, we therefore assume that verbal monitoring is
reduced during verbal mind wandering, hence the absence of
self-editing arrows on the unintentional side in Figure 1.
The ConDialInt Model: Functional
Neuroanatomy of Multidimensional Inner
Speech
We propose a neurocognitive model that accounts for the
varieties of inner speech along the three dimensions described
above, and for their monitoring. The ConDialInt model
(for Condensation-Dialogality-Intentionality) is based on the
preliminary account presented in Lœvenbruck et al. (2018),
which focused on the latest stage of the production of intentional
inner speech, i.e., articulatory planning. In this preliminary
account, inner speech monitoring was based on a predictive
control scheme, inspired from Frith et al. (2000) and also
described in Rapin et al. (2013) and Perrone-Bertolotti et al.
(2014). In Lœvenbruck (2018), a provisional extension of
this account has been sketched, in which formulation and
conceptualization stages were added to the articulatory planning
stage. We further elaborate on these propositions and consider a
more comprehensive neurocognitive model which addresses the
three dimensions of inner speech (Figure 2). The ConDialInt
model is limited to oral language (inner speech), since available
data on inner sign language production are too scant, but we
speculate that the auditory processes and representations invoked
here for inner oral language may be replaced with visual elements
to account for inner sign language.
In the ConDialInt model, verbal monitoring is based on a
hierarchical predictive control scheme. Such a scheme has been
originally proposed for complex movement control by Haruno
et al. (2003) and Pacherie (2008). Predictive control has been
successfully implemented in speech motor control (e.g., Postma,
2000; Guenther et al., 2006; Houde and Nagarajan, 2011). It
is based on the pairing of two types of internal models, a
forward model (predictor) and an inverse model (controller). The
inverse model computes a motor command, while the forward
model predicts the consequence of the ongoing command,
using an efference copy of this command. Monitoring is based
on several comparisons between desired, predicted and actual
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FIGURE 2 | The ConDialInt neurocognitive model of multidimensional inner speech. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPF, dorsolateral prefrontal; IFG, inferior frontal
gyrus; p. orb, pars orbitalis; p. op., pars opercularis; p. tri, pars triangularis; MTG/STG, middle temporal gyrus/superior temporal gyrus; IPL, inferior parietal lobule;
TPJ, temporo-parietal junction; th., thalamus; SMA, supplementary motor area; vPM, ventral premotor cortex; M1, primary motor area.
sensory outcomes. The crucial comparison involves predicted
and desired signals: it allows errors to be monitored before the
action is even accomplished. In hierarchical predictive control,
pairs of controllers and predictors are organized in cascade,
with bidirectional information processing across levels. This type
of control has been applied to overt language production by
Pickering and Garrod (2013). According to them, monitoring
can take place at all stages of language production, using
a predictive scheme: Actual and predicted semantics can be
compared, as well as actual and predicted syntax, and actual
and predicted phonology. Any mismatch between actual outputs
and predictions may trigger a correction, by tuning the internal
models at each stage. The ConDialInt model is an adaptation
and extension of Pickering and Garrod’s (2013) hierarchical
predictive control model of overt speech production to covert
speech production. Importantly, compared with Pickering and
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Garrod’s original model, it provides a detailed implementation of
the predictive control scheme at each of the hierarchical levels.
This fine-grained implementation of predictive control enables us
to describe the varieties of inner speech along the condensation
dimension by integrating an inhibitory control mechanism that
can be applied at different levels in the hierarchy. The higher the
speech production flow is interrupted, the more condensed the
inner speech variety is. It accounts for dialogality by replacing the
speaker’s own internal models with internal models that simulate
other speakers’ vocal productions and by including perspective
switching mechanisms (from speaker to addressee). Finally, it
accounts for intentionality by incorporating different degrees of
production monitoring.
Another predictive account of inner speech has been provided
by Wilkinson and Fernyhough (2017). Their account takes a
predictive processing approach, stemming from Friston’s (2005)
active inference theory. Our own model is compatible with many
of their hypotheses, but slightly differs in a number of ways.
First, as explained below, we claim that inner speech, in its most
expanded form, does entail a stimulus, a sensation, and that this
sensation is a prediction, derived from motor commands. Second,
we argue that inner speaking (in an expanded way) is indeed
imagining oneself speaking, i.e., simulating the act of speaking,
and that this simulation can take place with different voices,
giving rise to different percepts. We speculate that speakers
develop internal (or generative) models of themselves as well
as of others. And these internal models allow them to simulate
different voices. Third, we assume that the ability to engage
in dialogs (covertly and overtly) comes with a mechanism by
which speakers can hold track of perspectives. This mechanism
allows one to imagine that someone is speaking to them. As
we describe below, it is precisely this ability which explains the
move from “me speaking” to “other speaking” that Wilkinson and
Fernyhough argue is lacking in more traditional self-monitoring
models of inner speech. We contend that this perspective
switching ability, together with voice modulation (own voice vs.
other voice), lies at the origin of auditory verbal hallucination,
when self-monitoring goes awry.
Our model resolves a few ambiguities in Pickering and
Garrod’s original model, which does not specify in detail what
the forward-inverse pairs implement at each of the hierarchical
levels. In our view, at the lowest level (articulatory planning),
the predictor-controller pair functions just as described in
typical predictive control models of action control (e.g., Miall
and Wolpert, 1996). The predictor model is thus a model
of the biophysical speech apparatus, that converts motor
commands (or rather efference copies of motor commands) into
predicted articulatory movements and their resulting sounds and
somatosensory percepts. At the higher levels (formulation and
conceptualization), however, there is no biophysical apparatus
to be modeled, and no movements or sounds to be predicted.
The predicted representations at these levels are abstract phonetic
goals and preverbal messages. We assume, therefore, that the
pairs of predictors and controllers in the two highest hierarchical
levels are not models of any biophysical apparatus. They are
computational procedures that convert one type of mental
representation (e.g., broad language goal) into another type of
mental representation (e.g., preverbal message). Consequently,
in the ConDialInt model, hierarchical predictive control of inner
speech runs as follows. At the conceptualization stage, the broad
language goal is converted into a desired preverbal message by
a conceptualization controller. This desired preverbal message is
the highly condensed inner speech percept. It is sent back as input
to a conceptualization predictor, which predicts the language
goal that would derive from it. Desired and predicted language
goals can thus be compared, provided that the desired goal is
buffered, so that desired and predicted signals are temporally
aligned (as represented by the 1t triangle in Figure 2). Any
error at this early monitoring stage can be corrected for, by
sending an error signal to the conceptualization controller and
by delaying lower level processes. At the formulation stage, the
desired preverbal message is converted into a desired phonetic
goal by a formulation controller. This desired phonetic goal
corresponds to a semi-expanded inner speech percept and can
be transformed (in the articulatory planning stage) into motor
commands. In robotics or limb control theory, goals are desired
configurational states of the peripheral motor system, specified
in terms of position and velocity of the motor apparatus (e.g.,
Miall and Wolpert, 1996). This is appropriate for movements
of the hand or arm. In the case of dynamic speech control,
it is unlikely that the phonetic targets of the speakers are
exclusively specified in terms of spatial configurations, i.e.,
positions and velocities of the speech articulators. Many studies
suggest instead that speech targets are defined in both auditory
and articulatory terms (for arguments on auditory targets see
e.g., Perkell et al., 1997 or Guenther et al., 2006; for arguments
on articulatory, i.e., somatosensory, targets, see Saltzman and
Munhall, 1989, Browman and Goldstein, 1989 or Tremblay et al.,
2003; for arguments on auditory-somatosensory targets, see e.g.,
Lœvenbruck, 1996, Patri et al., 2018, Perkell, 2012 or Perrier
et al., 1996). We therefore argue that the phonetic goal is a
supramodal integration of auditory and somatosensory (and
perhaps even visual) representations. A formulation predictor
can transform the phonetic goal back into a predicted preverbal
message, which can be compared with the (buffered, see 1t
triangle) desired one. Any error at this intermediate monitoring
stage can be corrected for by sending an error signal to the
formulation controller (and perhaps also, by bottom-up cascade,
to the conceptualization controller) and by delaying lower level
processes. It has been claimed that the formulation stage itself can
be divided into grammatical and phonological encoding (see e.g.,
Levelt, 1989). In this case, then, the pair of controller-predictor
at the formulation stage should be replaced with two pairs, one
for each sublevel. Lastly, at the articulatory planning stage, the
desired phonetic goal is converted into motor commands by
an articulatory-planning controller. In the case of overt speech,
the motor commands are fed to the speech apparatus, resulting
in articulatory movements and sounds. In the case of covert
production, the motor commands are inhibited, resulting in no
movement of the speech apparatus. In both overt and covert
cases, an efference copy of the motor commands is sent to
an articulatory-planning predictor which generates a predicted
sensory experience (ahead of the actual experience, in the case
of overt speech).
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This sensory experience corresponds to the percept of an inner
voice, with auditory as well as somatosensory qualities. As we
have argued in Lœvenbruck et al. (2018) and Perrone-Bertolotti
et al. (2014), inner speech can be associated with auditory
as well as somatosensory representations. Somatosensory
representations include tactile and proprioceptive sensations
in the speech organs, that, like auditory sensations, result
from imagined articulatory gestures. The claim that the inner
voice has auditory qualities is supported by introspective
data on timbre, pitch, and intensity (e.g., Egger, 1881), by
behavioral findings (e.g., Reisberg et al., 1989; Smith et al.,
1995; Corley et al., 2011; Dell and Oppenheim, 2015) and by
neuroimaging data (e.g., Bookheimer et al., 1995; Sato et al., 2004;
Lœvenbruck et al., 2005; Basho et al., 2007). The assumption
that somatosensory representations may sometimes also be
at play comes from introspective data (Taine, 1870; Paulhan,
1886) as well as a few neuroimaging results (e.g., Rosen et al.,
2000; Huang et al., 2002). Further empirical data are needed
to define whether somatosensory signals are systematically
involved during expanded inner speech. Our model includes
this possibility. The argument that these multisensory signals
result from simulated motor actions of the speech organs is itself
supported by introspective experiments (Bain, 1855; Stricker,
1885), physiological measurements (Jacobson, 1931; Sokolov,
1972; Conrad and Schönle, 1979; McGuigan and Dollins, 1989;
Livesay et al., 1996) as well as neuroimaging data (Bookheimer
et al., 1995; McGuire et al., 1996; Baciu et al., 1999; Palmer et al.,
2001; Shergill et al., 2001; Huang et al., 2002; Basho et al., 2007;
Partovi et al., 2012).
The multisensory experience is integrated into a predicted
supramodal representation which can be compared with the
(buffered, see 1t triangle) desired phonetic goal. Any error at
this last monitoring stage can be corrected for by sending an
error signal to the articulatory-planning controller (this error
signal may perhaps also be fed back to higher-level controllers)
to issue new commands. In the case of overt speech production,
this allows for errors to be corrected before the utterance is
even produced, a strong argument for predictive control. In
action control, it has been claimed (by Frith et al., 2000, for
instance), that the efference copy mechanism is crucial to the
sense of agency, the feeling of being the agent of our own
action. In Rapin et al. (2013) and Lœvenbruck et al. (2018), it
was argued that, in inner speech, the sense of agency is derived
from the comparison between desired and predicted signals (see
also Tian and Poeppel, 2012 and Swiney and Sousa, 2014).
We further elaborate on this assumption, by claiming that the
comparisons between desired and predicted signals at each level
provide a sense of agency (referred to as “A” in Figure 2) of the
inner production. This is represented with a “<” sign at each
level, symbolizing the presence of a desired signal ahead of the
predicted signal. Several studies have reported dampened neural
response in auditory cortex during inner speech and silently
mouthed speech compared with speech perception (e.g., Ford
and Mathalon, 2004; Agnew et al., 2013). One interpretation is
that the monitoring mechanism not only allows to check that
predicted signals are similar to the desired ones, but also plays
a role in sensory attenuation. When desired and predicted signals
match, a dampening of the self-generated sensory experience
takes place, so that any external sensory experience is easier
to detect (e.g., Blakemore et al., 2002; Ford and Mathalon,
2004). The ConDialInt model therefore includes an attenuation
mechanism at the articulatory planning stage, when desired and
predicted signals are consistent.
As concerns the condensation dimension, the ConDialInt
model includes inhibitory control mechanisms at each
hierarchical level (orange arrow in Figure 2). The level at
which the speech production flow is inhibited defines the degree
of condensation. Inhibition at the formulation stage interrupts
production at the preverbal message and results in highly
condensed inner speech. Inhibition at the articulatory planning
stage terminates production at the phonetic goal, giving rise
to a semi-expanded variety. When inhibition occurs further
down the production flow, it cancels out motor commands but a
predicted sensory experience can still be computed. Therefore,
inhibition at this level prevents articulatory gestures from being
generated but releases the experience of expanded inner speech,
with auditory and somatosensory qualities, i.e., the little voice we
can hear in our head.
The ConDialInt model also accounts for dialogality. When
inner speech is produced with one’s own voice, the processes
described above simply unfold, stopping at various stages,
depending on the condensation dimension. When one covertly
imitates someone else’s voice, the controller and predictor
internal models are adapted, modulated, in order to control and
predict another voice than one’s own. Pickering and Garrod
(2013) have claimed that their hierarchical predictive control
scheme can also account for efficient speech comprehension, by
deriving predictions of the interlocutor’s language goals, using
predictor models. This implies that listeners are able to build
adapted internal models of their interlocutor, at the different
stages of language processing. Indeed, when we know someone’s
voice, and know them well, we can often also recognize their
phonological, lexical, syntactic, and prosodic habits. In such
cases, we can therefore, presumably, make reasonably accurate
adaptations of our own predictors and controllers, that fit with
our interlocutors’ features, at each linguistic level. Similarly,
when we covertly imitate someone, adaptations of the controller-
predictor pairs at each stage could also be made, resulting in
predicted signals that correspond to a different inner voice than
our own. In Figure 2, the possibility of adapting predictors
and controllers is represented with a blue-red fading pattern
(with blue for self, and red for others). The outputs of the
predictors and controllers at each stage (which correspond to
inner speech varieties) are represented with blue-red bordered
boxes. Moreover, dialogality (in the polyphonic sense explained
above) also implies switches in perspective. Not only can we
mentally imitate someone’s voice, but we can also imagine that
someone else is talking to us. Dedicated neural mechanisms have
been shown to be at play when participants are asked to imagine
being the agent of the action or when they imagine another
person being the agent (Ruby and Decety, 2001). Compared with
imagining being the agent (first-person perspective), imagining
another person being the agent (third-person perspective) has
been shown to elicit responses in the right inferior parietal lobule,
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the precuneus, the posterior cingulate, and the fronto-polar
cortex. In line with these findings on motor imagery, we assume
that the dialogality dimension involves a perspective switching
mechanism, as well as further monitoring and executive control
processes. In monologal inner speech, a first-person perspective
is taken, in which one imagines being the agent of the speech
action. In dialogal inner speech, a third-person perspective
is taken, in which one imagines another person being the
agent. The perspective switch, from first-person to third-person,
probably occurs during the latest stage of speech production,
i.e., during articulatory planning, when physical embodiment
takes place and the voice is being generated (predicted). The
initial stages, conceptualization and formulation, are more
abstract, less embodied, and can be initiated with one’s own or
someone else’s linguistic habits. Up to these stages, imagining
someone else speaking (rather that oneself) merely requires
using internal models that are adapted to that individual’s
linguistic characteristics (lexicon, syntax, prosody). Changing the
agent of the imagined verbal action does not otherwise modify
conceptualization and formulation. Articulatory planning, on the
other hand, is affected by the change in agent, since it is the stage
at which the verbal material becomes physically instantiated,
with full articulatory specification. Articulatory planning involves
predicting the temporal dynamics of the position and velocity
of the speech articulators. When one imagines oneself speaking,
these articulatory configurations are computed from a first-
person perspective. When one imagines another individual
speaking, the dynamics of the configurations of the speech
apparatus is computed with a third-person perspective. The
ConDialInt model therefore includes a mechanism by which this
change in point of view can operate. This is illustrated in Figure 2,
by the addition of purple boxes at the articulatory planning
stage, which account for the perspective switch that operates in
dialogal inner speech.
As concerns the intentionality dimension, we argue that verbal
monitoring only concerns intentional inner speech. During
intentional inner speech, the signals generated by the controllers
at each level are converted by predictors into predicted signals
that are issued back one level-up in the hierarchy to be compared
with initial desired signals. As stressed above, the comparison
process is more lenient than in overt speech, hence the
approximate symbols in Figure 2. In unintentional inner speech,
we assume that no verbal monitoring takes place: unbidden
verbal thoughts arise, but they are not confronted to initial
objectives. Therefore, the control is merely feedforward, but
comparisons between predictions and goals may still take place,
for agency to be felt. Even unintentional inner speech comes with
a feeling of agency. When that feeling is defective, auditory verbal
hallucination may occur. In the ConDialInt model a distinction
is therefore made between verbal monitoring (M), which only
concerns intentional varieties (represented in green in Figure 2),
and agency attribution (A), which concerns all varieties.
We speculate on a tentative neuroanatomical grounding
for this functional account, based on previous neuroimaging
studies and descriptions. The predominantly left-lateralized
neural regions associated with the different processes are listed
in each box in Figure 2. As concerns the conceptualization stage,
following considerations by Blank et al. (2002), Caplan et al.
(2000), Duffau et al. (2014), Gernsbacher and Kaschak (2003),
Haller et al. (2005), Hickok (2009), Indefrey et al. (2001), Indefrey
and Levelt (2004), Lœvenbruck et al. (2005), Rauschecker and
Scott (2009), Tian and Poeppel (2013), and Tremblay and Dick
(2016), we assume that the ventral stream of regions engaged
are predominantly left-lateralized and include the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex, the pars
orbitalis of the inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal pole and
the posterior middle temporal gyrus, with ventral temporo-
frontal connections presumably involving the inferior occipito-
frontal fasciculus (fascicles are not mentioned in Figure 2,
for simplification).
Next, based on consideration by Duffau et al. (2014),
among others, we presume that the formulation stage, which
generates lexico-prosodico-syntactico-morpho-phonological
representations, involves a dorsal stream, with recruitment of the
posterior part of the left superior and middle temporal lobe as
well as the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, pars opercularis) and
with dorsal connections via the superior longitudinal fasciculus,
as well as the arcuate fasciculus. We add that the left inferior
parietal lobule (IPL) is recruited at this stage, to form the
supramodal phonetic goal. We have argued that the phonetic
goal is in an integrated supramodal format, which is consistent
with IPL recruitment. But it is still an open question whether,
at this formulation stage, the activation of the left IFG precedes
that of the IPL or whether, instead, the IPL itself provides
efferences to the IFG. Figure 2 opts for the first scheme (at the
formulation stage).
We claim that, for expanded varieties of inner speech,
articulatory planning follows. A preliminary neural network for
this last stage was presented in Lœvenbruck et al. (2018). This
proposition was based on considerations and models by Indefrey
(2011), Guenther and Vladusich (2012), Hickok (2012), and
Tian and Poeppel (2013), among others. We slightly revise this
initial proposition to better capture the notion of supramodal
phonetic goal described above, to allow for suggestions by Flinker
et al. (2015) and by Duffau et al. (2014) on temporo-frontal
connections, and to include recent considerations on the role
of the cerebellum in language production and internal models
(see e.g., Imamizu and Kawato, 2009; Buckner et al., 2011; Smet
et al., 2013; Mariën et al., 2014; Diedrichsen and Zotow, 2015;
Sokolov et al., 2017). Our speculation takes advantage of the
double representation of cerebral regions in the anterior and
posterior lobes of the cerebellum (see e.g., Sokolov et al., 2017).
Figure 3 illustrates this revised view of the left cerebral and right
cerebellar regions involved. The phonetic goal is sent from the left
inferior parietal lobule (or the left IFG, if IPL-IFG connections
are in the reversed order, see above) to the cerebellum (possibly
the anterior lobe), via the pons. A conversion takes place
through the controller in the cerebellum, which generates a motor
specification sent to the left frontal regions via the thalamus.
Motor programs are then issued, by coordinating the motor
specification, stemming from the cerebellum, with ongoing
speech actions. We speculate that the regions involved in this
process are the triangular and opercular IFG and the anterior
insula, then the ventral premotor cortex, the supplementary area
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FIGURE 3 | Neuroanatomical network of articulatory planning during expanded inner speech. A tentative description of the sequences of activation is provided,
ending up with the comparison between desired and predicted phonetic goals within the inferior parietal lobule. Numbers refer to the assumed sequence of
activations. The cross sign refers to the comparison that takes place between the intended phonetic goal and the integrated multisensory prediction.
and the primary motor cortex (via the frontal aslant track, not
shown in Figures 2, 3). There are arguments for the hypothesis
that the IFG recruitment precedes ventral premotor cortex
activation (e.g., the electrocorticography speech production study
by Flinker et al., 2015) and that the inferior parietal lobule
(supramarginal gyrus) efferences toward the ventral premotor
cortex, via the anterior part of the superior longitudinal fascicle
(Duffau et al., 2014). There are also arguments for the existence
of connections from the IPL toward the cerebellum (Miall,
2003; Imamizu and Kawato, 2009) and from the cerebellum
to the frontal motor and premotor areas, possibly including
the IFG (Imamizu and Kawato, 2009; Murdoch, 2010). What
remains unclear, is whether the direct (not mediated by the
cerebellum) parieto-frontal connection is associated with the
articulatory planning stage or only relevant to the formulation
stage (as assumed here). We claim that the motor commands
that result from the motor specification are not issued to the
speech apparatus (inhibition) but they are sent, via the pons, to
the cerebellum (possibly the posterior lobe), which, we speculate,
includes a predictor. We further speculate that the cerebellum
issues, via the thalamus, a multisensory prediction, which is
processed by the auditory cortex (superior temporal gyrus) and
the somatosensory cortex (postcentral gyrus). This multisensory
prediction gives rise to the percept of an inner voice, that
unfolds over time. The sequence of activation from inferior
parietal to temporal cortex (mediated, we argue, by cerebellum
and inferior frontal regions) is compatible with the MEG data
obtained by Tian and Poeppel (2010). In an articulation imagery
tasks, they found that the auditory response was elicited around
170 ms after a posterior parietal activity (where we think the
phonetic goal is built) was recorded. We speculate that the
auditory and somatosensory responses are further integrated
into a supramodal representation, via the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ). The resulting supramodal phonetic prediction
is compared with the desired phonetic goal within the IPL and
monitoring can take place. Note that in this account, the IFG is
involved at two stages. In an early stage, during formulation, we
consider that the triangular part of the IFG plays a role in the
monitoring of thematic roles (who-does-what-to-whom) that is
crucial to morphosyntactic processing (see Caplan and Hanna,
1998; Caplan et al., 2000; Indefrey et al., 2001; Lœvenbruck
et al., 2005). In a later (articulatory planning) stage, we claim
that the opercular part may be involved in the coordination
and sequencing of articulatory gestures (Blank et al., 2002;
Indefrey and Levelt, 2004).
Moreover, we presume that cognitive control, which has been
defined as the “ability to orchestrate thought and action in
accordance with internal goals” (Miller and Cohen, 2001) must
take place to inhibit motor execution and to interrupt production
before articulatory planning, when appropriate (condensation
dimension). Cognitive control is also needed to launch the
adaptation of internal models (controllers/predictors) at each
stage, when different voices are imagined (dialogality dimension),
and to tune the strength of the monitoring processes depending
on the degree of willfulness (intentionality dimension). Cognitive
control has been shown to recruit various regions of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC), including dorsolateral PFC, ventrolateral
PFC, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. It is still
debatable what the roles of the different subregions of PFC are
and it is beyond the purpose of this paper to describe them.
We refer to Ridderinkhof et al. (2004) for more detail. We have
therefore added the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) above all processes. In addition, the modulation
and adaptation of internal models during dialogal inner speech
presumably requires memory retrieval processes, in search of
the voice quality and linguistic features of the imagined other.
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We have therefore added the hippocampus in the set of crucial
regions. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the right IPL, the
precuneus, the posterior cingulate, and the fronto-polar cortex
are claimed to play a role in first-/third-person perspective taking
(Ruby and Decety, 2001; Decety, 2005). Decety and Grèzes (2006)
provide further argument for the role of the right IPL in the
attribution of actions, emotions, and thoughts to their respective
agents when one mentally simulates actions for oneself or for
another individual. Their review of the literature show that it is
difficult to assess whether the crucial region in this process is the
rostral part of the right IPL or the right TPJ. The purple boxes in
Figure 2 for the operations of phonetic goal construction, sensory
experience processing and multisensory integration, represent
the perspective switching operations, which presumably include a
shift in hemispheric dominance, from left to right IPL and/or TPJ,
as well as recruitment of the precuneus and posterior cingulate.
Assessing the Neural Networks
Mediating Multidimensional Inner
Speech
The aim of the present study is to examine the neuroanatomical
assumptions of the ConDialInt model by investigating the
neural correlates of multidimensional inner speech using fMRI.
Previous fMRI studies of inner speech did not address dialogality
and intentionality simultaneously.
Along the dialogality dimension, the study by Tian et al.
(2016) compared inner speaking (articulation imagery) and
imagining someone else speaking (hearing imagery), but only
single syllables were used, which is restrictive. In addition, the
participants were explicitly trained to mentally articulate during
inner speaking, while they were asked to minimize articulatory
feeling and rely instead on auditory memory processes during
hearing imagery. These results are interesting but they are not
sufficiently informative as to which neural networks are involved
in less constrained inner speech (i.e., during full sentence
production and with less attentional focus on articulatory
sensation and auditory memory). The study by Alderson-Day
et al. (2016) addressed dialogality in a more ecological way,
using scenarios designed to elicit either monologal (soliloquial)
or dialogal (imagining a dialog with another person) inner
speech. Participants used one single voice in the monologal
condition and several voices in the dialogal condition. Therefore,
comparing these two conditions does not allow to conclude
on the processes that specifically underlie perspective shifting,
without the confounding factor of voice modulation.
Along the intentionality dimension, Hurlburt et al. (2016)
carefully addressed the difference between intentional monologal
and unintentional monologal inner speech (which they refer
to as spontaneous inner speaking). They also investigated
unintentional dialogal inner speech (referred to as spontaneous
inner hearing). Although unintentional monologal inner speech
was relatively frequent, occurring in 29 percent of their
samples and for each of their five participants, unintentional
dialogal inner speech was rare (occurred zero times or twice)
for three participants. Further data are therefore needed on
dialogal inner speech.
The conditions in the present study were specifically designed
to compare inner speech varieties along the two dimensions
of dialogality and intentionality. To explore dialogality, three
controlled inner speech conditions were compared, during
which participants were instructed to mentally generate verbal
definitions of visually presented words (they were primed
with a written word and its pictorial illustration). In the
intentional monologal self-voice condition, participants were
asked to covertly produce a definition, with their own voice.
In the intentional dialogal other-voice condition, they were
instructed to imagine that someone was producing an utterance
addressed to them. Compared with the monologal self-voice
condition, this condition requires two additional processes:
mentally altering one’s voice, which implies prosodic and
voice quality control, and taking an allocentric perspective. To
specifically examine perspective taking, without the confounding
factor of voice alteration control, we added an intermediate
condition in which participants were asked to covertly produce
a definition, with someone else’s voice (intentional monologal
other-voice). To explore the intentionality dimension, in
addition to these conditions, a mind wandering session
took place, after which participants were asked to report
any spontaneously occurring verbal material. The mind
wandering session was also meant to allow us to explore the
condensation dimension. To assess to what extent auditory
processes are at play during inner speech, we added a speech
perception condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four healthy native speakers of French were included
(10 men; mean age = 29.5 years, SD = 10.04; 14 women,
mean age = 28.07 years, SD = 8.14). All participants were
right-handed (Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971),
scored average on a mental imagery questionnaire (based on
Sheehan, 1967), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
had no history of neurological or language disorders. Each
participant gave written informed consent and received 30€ for
their participation. Ethical approval was granted by the Comité
de Protection des Personnes (CPP) Sud-Est V and by the National
Competent Authority France-ANSM (Ref. CPP: 14-CHUG-39,
Ref. Promoteur: 38RC14.304, ID-RCB: 2014-A01403-44, Ref.
ANSM: 141200B-31, ClinicalTrials.gov ID: NCT02830100).
Tasks
Participants were first introduced to an avatar, who gave them
instructions and provided training for the five conditions. The
avatar had a saliently high-pitched voice which was sufficiently
strange (outside of an adult’s typical pitch range), yet easy to
imitate for everyone. The first four conditions included one
speech perception condition and three intentional inner speech
conditions. In these four conditions, each trial started with
the visual presentation of a written word and its illustration.
For example, the written word “ball,” with a picture of a ball
(framed within a stylized clock) was visually presented for 2 s,
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after which the clock rotated and the participant performed
the task, which lasted for 4 s. Each trial was repeated several
times in each condition (see section “Stimuli”). In the “Speech
Perception” (SP) condition, participants had to listen to the
definitions presented to them via MR compatible earphones. The
definitions were pronounced by the avatar with the high-pitched
voice. Each definition began with “This is something. . .”. In the
Monologal Self-voice inner speech (MS) condition, participants
had to mentally generate definitions of each of the visually
presented objects, using a sentence beginning with “This is
something.” Participants were not reading sentences, they had
to generate their own definitions. The stimuli were purely visual
(no audio presentation of the word). The Monologal Other-voice
inner speech (MO) condition was similar to the MS condition,
except that participants had to mentally imitate the high-pitched
voice of the avatar. In the Dialogal Other-voice (DO) condition,
participants had to imagine that the avatar was addressing them,
producing a sentence starting with “Here is a typical image
of a. . .” and ending with the name of the object, without
generating a definition (to reduce cognitive load). The fifth
condition investigated “Verbal Mind Wandering” (VMW). In
this condition, a written word and its illustration was first visually
presented for 2 s, in order to provide the same initial visual
stimulation as in the other four conditions. After the initial 2 s
written word-illustration presentation, participants were asked
to fixate a stylized clock rotating for 30 s. They were instructed
to monitor spontaneously occurring thoughts. At the end of the
trial, they reported the periods during which they experienced
verbal thoughts, by selecting time portions on the stylized clock
which appeared on the screen, using a joystick. The stimulus
presentation and collection of joystick responses were controlled
using the Presentation software (Neurobehavioral systems)1.
Stimuli
Four 30-word lists of nouns were created using the LEXIQUE
database (New et al., 2001). In order to facilitate the generation
of definitions, only frequent and imageable words were chosen.
All nouns were of neutral affective content and included
the categories of food, houseware, furniture, clothing and
transportation devices. Each list was randomly assigned to one
of the first four conditions. The lists were the same for all
participants. They were carefully matched for syllable counts,
frequency, familiarity, concreteness and imageability. Only one
item was presented (a clock) in the fifth condition (VMW).
The audio stimuli (for the SP condition) and the instructions
were recorded by two female native speakers of French in a quiet
room. One speaker generated the avatar’s voice contents, i.e.,
tasks instructions for SP, MO and DO, as well as definitions used
in the SP condition. The other speaker generated instructions
for the remaining conditions (VMW and MS). Audio signals
were digitized with a sampling frequency of 44199 Hz and 32-
bit resolution, then normalized in amplitude to the mean power
of all stimuli. The recorded definitions in the 30 test trials for the
SP condition lasted on average 2.87 s (SD = 0.44).
1http://www.neurobs.com
Expected Outcomes
Comparing the monologal self-voice (MS) condition with
baseline should help assessing the predictive control hypothesis.
Namely, it is expected that expanded inner speech in the MS
condition should recruit speech production processes down to
articulatory planning, resulting in a predicted signal, the inner
voice, with auditory qualities. It is expected that compared with
baseline, MS should recruit hippocampus and posterior middle
temporal gyrus for the conceptualization stage. The posterior
temporal lobe and left inferior frontal gyrus should be recruited
for the formulation stage. The left inferior parietal lobule
should be activated for the articulatory planning stage (for the
specification of the supramodal phonetic goal), as well as the right
cerebellum (controller model, for motor commands specification
and predictor model for sensory prediction), the left premotor
cortex, left IFG and insula (for motor command coordination)
and the auditory cortex (for sensory processing). Somatosensory
cortex might also be recruited. Furthermore, the prefrontal cortex
(middle and superior frontal regions) should be recruited to
issue inhibitory control signals, preventing movement of the
speech apparatus.
Comparing the MS condition with the speech perception
(SP) condition should further assess whether auditory processing
is at play during expanded inner speech and whether some
attenuation occurs, relative to actual speech perception, as
predicted by the model.
Comparing monologal other-voice (MO) and dialogal other-
voice (DO) each with the baseline and with SP should further
test the predictive control hypothesis and assess the recruitment
of motor and auditory processes. Comparing MO with MS
should shed light on the first aspect of dialogality, namely voice
modulation. Given that the most striking feature of the voice
to be mentally imitated was its high pitch, it can be speculated
that in MO, intonation control regions should be recruited.
In particular, it can be expected that the right inferior frontal
gyrus should be activated. In addition, the internal models
used in MS (and presumably associated with right cerebellar
activation) should be replaced with internal models adapted to
this new voice. The cerebellar recruitment might therefore differ
in these two conditions.
Comparing DO with MO should shed light on the second
aspect of dialogality, namely perspective shifting. Based on Ruby
and Decety’s (2001) study on perspective shifting, it can be
expected that, relative to MO, DO should additionally activate
the right parietal cortex, and more specifically, the inferior
and superior parietal lobules as well as the precuneus and the
posterior cingulate.
Comparing the verbal mind wandering (VMW) condition
to the baseline should contribute to better describe the
intentionality dimension and could potentially shed light on the
condensation dimension. It can be expected that compared with
the baseline, VMW should activate the default mode network
as well as speech production regions. Comparing VMW and
MS, MO and DO could potentially provide insight on the
neuroanatomical differences between varieties of inner speech
along the intentionality dimension.
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fMRI Protocol
A repeated-block design paradigm was used, with two runs, each
including all conditions (see Figure 4). In all five conditions,
participants were asked to remain perfectly still, not to make any
head movement and not to articulate. They were trained to do
so before entering the scanner. Each run consisted of a sequence
of blocks for the five conditions (e.g., SP, MS, MO, DO, VMW)
which was repeated three times. Each sequence contained five
trials of each of the five conditions. Thus, in each run, each
condition was presented in three different blocks of five trials,
resulting in 15 trials for each condition. In the SP, MS, MO, and
DO conditions, trials were separated by a fixation cross displayed
for 2 s. At the beginning of each block, an instruction screen was
displayed for 6 s while a recording of the instructions was played
in the earphones. Then five trials of the same condition were
run. A fixation cross was displayed for 8 s before and after each
block. When a participant was doing a task for the first time in
the run, the block started with three training trials. The sequence
of conditions was pseudo-randomized across participants, with
DO always after MO, to reduce confusion between tasks. For
each participant, the same sequence order was used for all six
repetitions of sequences. This resulted in 30 test trials (two runs,
three blocks of five trials in each run) plus six training trials
(two runs, three training trials in each run) per condition per
participant (i.e., a total of 144 trials for the first four conditions).
Pre- and Post-experiment
Questionnaires
One day before the experiment, participants filled in the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and a mental
imagery questionnaire, based on and translated from Sheehan
(1967). On the day of the experiment, before entering the
scanner, they were trained to report on inner speech and
to intentionally produce different varieties of inner speech,
without articulating. After the experiment, they filled in a recall
questionnaire with a list of 60 words, for which they checked
whether they had generated a definition in the scanner (20
words were distractors). This aimed at testing their attention
during the tasks: if participants were focused on defining the
words presented to them during the intentional inner speech
tasks in the scanner, when presented with those words after the
experiment, they should remember finding a definition for them.
Participants also filled in subjective questionnaires to report how
well they performed the tasks and to describe their thought
contents during VMW.
fMRI Acquisition
Experiments were performed using a whole-body 3T MR Philips
imager (Achieva 3.0T TX Philips, Philips Medical Systems, Best,
NetherLands) with a 32-channel head coil at IRMaGe MRI facility
(Grenoble, France). The manufacturer-provided gradient echo
planar imaging sequence (FEEPI) was used. Forty-two adjacent
axial slices parallel to the bi-commissural plane were acquired
in non-interleaved mode. Slice thickness was 3 mm. The in-
plane voxel size was 3 × 3 mm (240 × 240 mm field of
view with a 80 × 80 pixel data matrix). The main sequence
parameters were: TR = 2.5 s, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 82◦. Two
fMRI runs were conducted while subjects performed the tasks.
During the break between the two runs, a T1-weighted high-
resolution 3D anatomical volume was acquired, with a 3D T1
FIGURE 4 | Timeline of the experimental procedure. Two functional runs were completed, each including the five conditions. Each run included three repetitions of
the sequence of five conditions. In each repetition, five trials of the MS, MO, DO, and SP conditions were elicited as well as one VMW session. tr. trials, training trials.
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TFE sequence (field of view = 256 × 224 × 175 mm; resolution:
0.89 × 0.89 × 1.37 mm; acquisition matrix: 192 × 137 × 128
pixels; reconstruction matrix: 288 × 288 × 128 pixels).
Participants’ gazes were monitored with an eyetracker to ensure
they followed instructions.
fMRI Data Analysis
Image preprocessing and analyses were completed using
SPM12 (SPM122, Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology,
London, United Kingdom). Standard preprocessing steps were
implemented, including slice time correction, rigid body motion
correction, a high-pass filter at 1/512 Hz to filter low-frequency
non-linear drifts, coregistration of the functional images to
each subject’s T1 anatomical images, and normalization to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. All normalized
functional images were smoothed using a Gaussian filter with
a full width at half maximum of 8 mm. Individual subject
analyses were conducted by constructing a general linear model
for each condition. Five regressors were defined: SP, MS, MO,
DO, and VMW. For all conditions, regressors were modelled
as box-car functions convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
response function (Friston et al., 1994). Inspection of the
movement parameters derived from realignment corrections
suggests that head movement was limited. Movement parameters
were still included as factors of no interest. The run number
was added as an additional factor. For the first-level analysis,
five contrasts corresponding to each regressor of interest vs.
implicit baseline were computed. For the second level, several
analyses have been carried out: (i) one-sample T-tests, in order to
measure main effects of experimental conditions, (ii) conjunction
analyses between each inner speech condition and SP, between
all five conditions, between all four inner speech conditions,
and between all inner speech conditions grouped together
and SP, in order to examine whether perception processes
were recruited in all varieties of inner speech, and (iii) one-
way within-subject ANOVA, in order to measure differential
effects between conditions (Friston et al., 2005; Henson and
Penny, 2005). To study the varieties of intentional inner speech
along the dialogality dimension, MS was compared with MO
(effect of changing voice) and MO was compared with DO
(switching from monolog to dialog). To explore the intentionality
dimension, activations in the VMW condition were compared
with activations in the intentional MS condition. In all analyses
(except for the contrasts between MS and MO), significant
voxel clusters on each t-map were identified with Family Wise
Error (FWE) correction at p < 0.05. For the MS > MO and
MO > MS contrasts, no activation was found at a FWE-
corrected threshold. This was not completely unexpected, given
that these two conditions are very similar and they only subtly
differ in the quality of the voice to be mentally produced.
Although this is statistically fragile, we report the results at an
uncorrected threshold (p < 0.001), since these contrasts are
interesting in the framework of our model. Moreover, these
preliminary results might guide future neuroimaging studies
on inner speech production and imitation, and might help
2https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
identifying regions of interest. Location of cluster maxima was
determined using Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) map
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). In order to quantify potential
hemispheric asymmetry changes between conditions (from MS
to MO and DO), percent MR signal intensity variations, or
percent signal changes (%SC), were extracted within a set of
regions of interest (ROIs). These ROIs included Frontal Inferior
Opercularis, Frontal Inferior Triangularis, Frontal Inferior
Orbitalis, Precentral gyrus, Supplementary Motor Area, Superior
Temporal, Middle Temporal, Supramarginal gyrus, Inferior
Parietal lobule and Superior Parietal lobule, which are among the
crucial regions expected to be recruited during expanded inner
speech production, according to the ConDialInt model. The ROIs
were anatomically defined using the AAL atlas, in both left and
right hemispheres.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
For the recall task carried out after the fMRI experiment, the
mean accuracy scores across subjects was 84.42% ± 16.63.
Only one participant performed poorly (below 50% accuracy).
This high mean score, together with the eyetracker monitoring,
suggest that participants were focused on the tasks.
After each VMW trial, participants used a joystick to report
the presence of verbal episodes on the stylized clock displayed
on the screen. Over the two runs (six VMW trials), participants
reported between 4 and 22 verbal episodes, with a mean of
13 episodes. The proportion of time spent on verbal thought
in all VWM trials ranged from 4 to 67%, with a mean of
35.6% (SD = 15.04).
The subjective post-scan questionnaires also confirmed that
the VMW condition contained verbal episodes. More specifically,
concerning the condensation dimension, as the graph across all
participants presented in Figure 5 suggests, the VMW condition
included various degrees of condensation, from fully expanded
sentences (reported as “sometimes present” in 17% of the
participants and “often present” in 46%) to speech fragments
(reported as “sometimes present” in 38% and “often present” in
29%), words (“sometimes present” in 4% and “often present” in
13%) and even semantic concepts without words (“sometimes
present” in 21%).
In addition, the post-scan questionnaires indicate that
participants rated their overall performance as correct. The MS
condition was rated as easier than the MO condition, itself easier
than the DO condition.
Functional MRI Data
Effects of Conditions: Cerebral Correlates of Speech
Perception and Inner Speech Varieties
Contrasts between each condition and the baseline are presented
in Table 1, all p < 0.05, FWE correction. All contrasts revealed
activation of the right middle and superior occipital cortex and
inferior temporal (fusiform) gyrus.
In addition to the activation in visual cortex, the contrast
between speech perception (SP) and baseline revealed increased
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FIGURE 5 | Reported degree of condensation for the inner speech episodes in the VMW condition, across all participants.
activation in bilateral superior temporal gyri (STG, Brodmann
Area (BA) 21, 22, 41), left supramarginal gyrus (SMG, BA
40), left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, BA 44, 47), left superior
frontal gyrus (SFG, BA 8), bilateral premotor (PM) cortex,
left supplementary motor area (SMA), left motor cortex, left
hippocampus (Figure 6A).
Compared with baseline, intentional monologal self-voice
inner speech (MS) yielded greater left hemisphere activation in
the IFG (BA 44, 45, 47), middle frontal gyrus (MFG, BA 10), SFG
(BA 8), SMG (BA 39), posterior middle/superior temporal gyrus
(MTG/STG, BA 21, 22), hippocampus, together with bilateral
SMA, bilateral PM cortex, and right cerebellum (Figure 6B).
Compared with baseline, intentional monologal other-voice
inner speech (MO) revealed greater left hemisphere activation
in IFG (BA 44, 47), MFG (BA 10), hippocampus, together with
bilateral PM cortex, bilateral SMA, right insula (BA 13) and right
cerebellum (Figure 6C).
Compared with baseline, intentional dialogal other-voice
inner speech (DO) yielded greater left hemisphere activation in
MFG (BA 10), middle occipital gyrus (BA 19), left insula (BA
13), together with bilateral PM cortex, IFG (BA 44, 47), and
SMA (Figure 6D).
Compared with baseline, verbal mind wandering (VMW)
yielded greater left hemisphere activation in SMA, together with
bilateral IFG (BA 45, 47), insula (BA 13), MFG (BA 9, 10),
SMA, medial SFG (BA 9), inferior (BA 39) and superior (BA
7) parietal cortex, precuneus, and left caudate, thalamus, and
cerebellum (Figure 6E).
Common Neural Correlates for Inner Speech and
Speech Perception
To investigate whether perception processes were recruited in
all varieties of inner speech, conjunctions between SP and
either MS, MO, DO, or VMW were examined. Conjunctions
between each condition and SP are presented in Table 2, all
p< 0.05, FWE correction.
The conjunction between MS and SP (Figure 7A) confirmed
that the left IFG, SFG, MTG/STG, SMA, SMG, hippocampus,
bilateral PM cortex, and occipital/posterior MTG were
recruited by both conditions. The conjunction between
MO and SP (Figure 7B) yielded activation in left IFG, SFG,
MTG, and hippocampus, as well as bilateral SMA, PM, and
occipital/posterior MTG, thus revealing a weaker middle
temporal cortex activation.
The conjunction between DO and SP (Figure 7C) yielded
activation in left IFG, SFG, bilateral PM, SMA, right insula
and bilateral occipital/posterior MTG but no middle temporal
cortex activation.
The conjunction between VMW and SP (Figure 7D)
yielded activation in left IFG, SFG, bilateral PM, SMA,
and occipital/posterior MTG but no middle temporal
cortex activation.
Conjunctions between all four inner speech conditions (MS,
MO, DO, VMW), between all five conditions (MS, MO, DO,
VMW, SP), and between all inner speech conditions grouped
together and SP are listed in Table 2. Commonly activated regions
in all four inner speech conditions (MS, MO, DO, VMW) and in
all five conditions (MS, MO, DO, VMW, SP) include the left IFG,
and bilateral SMA, but do not include the auditory cortex. The
regions that show a conjunction of activity in SP and all inner
speech conditions grouped together are illustrated in Figure 7E.
In addition to left IFG and SMA, they include left supramarginal
and middle temporal gyri.
To further examine the degree of auditory activation in
the different conditions, we extracted the %SC within a large
temporal ROI including left Superior and Middle Temporal
gyri (anatomically defined using AAL), in each hemisphere. The
values are displayed in Figure 8 for each of the 5 conditions,
in the left and right hemispheres. For each hemisphere, a
one-way ANOVA was run on the %SC with condition as
a factor. In the left ROI, results showed that the %SC in
the SP condition was significantly different from each of the
inner speech conditions (p < 0.001), with higher left temporal
activation in SP than in each of the inner speech conditions.
In addition, the MS condition was significantly different from
VMW (F(1,23) = 7.92, p < 0.001), with higher left temporal
activation in MS than VMW. In the right ROI, the %SC in the
SP condition was significantly higher than in each of the inner
speech conditions (p < 0.001). In addition, the %SC in the right
ROI in the DO condition was significantly higher than in MS
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TABLE 1 | Contrasts between each condition and the baseline.
Contrast MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
SP > Baseline Temporal_Sup_L 784 15.27 −63 −22 5
Temporal_Sup_L 11.03 −45 −22 5
Temporal_Sup_R 491 13.32 63 −10 −1
Temporal_Sup_R 12.90 63 −28 8
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 345 8.85 −51 35 14
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 8.40 −45 23 −7
Occipital_Mid_R 12 8.14 39 −82 14
Precentral_L 27 7.69 −51 −7 47
Temporal_Inf_R 17 7.51 45 −61 −7
Supp_Motor_Area_L 25 7.26 −9 8 62
Lingual_L 12 7.25 0 −79 −4
Frontal_Sup_2_L 29 7.22 −12 29 50
Supp_Motor_Area_L 6.43 −6 17 56
Precentral_R 4 6.91 54 2 44
Temporal_Inf_L 9 6.80 −45 −43 −13
Hippocampus_L 20 6.74 −21 −16 −19
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 5 6.58 −9 47 41
Fusiform_L 2 6.13 −33 −46 −19
Precentral_L 1 5.99 −42 2 53
MS > Baseline Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 2113 14.12 −48 11 5
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 14.08 −36 26 −1
Putamen_L 11.66 −18 11 −1
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 771 12.84 −3 26 41
Supp_Motor_Area_L 11.33 −6 17 62
Supp_Motor_Area_R 10.13 6 8 62
Occipital_Mid_R 116 9.97 36 −82 14
Occipital_Sup_R 8.07 18 −94 20
Frontal_Mid_2_L 37 7.75 −30 53 14
Temporal_Mid_L 38 7.73 −51 −40 2
Frontal_Sup_2_L 25 7.22 −9 53 35
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 6.26 −9 44 41
Occipital_Mid_L 50 6.89 −39 −67 −1
Temporal_Inf_L 6.45 −45 −52 −16
Calcarine_L 21 6.81 0 −82 −4
Precentral_R 5 6.79 54 2 44
SupraMarginal_L 2 6.58 −45 −43 32
Cerebellum_6_R 14 6.50 36 −64 −25
Fusiform_L 5 6.34 −30 −46 −19
Temporal_Pole_Sup_R 4 6.12 54 14 −4
Hippocampus_L 1 6.00 −18 −40 14
Insula_R 1 6.00 39 17 2
MO > Baseline Supp_Motor_Area_L 661 11.52 −9 17 47
Supp_Motor_Area_L 10.28 −9 5 62
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 717 11.51 −45 20 −7
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 11.12 −51 11 5
Occipital_Mid_R 29 9.74 30 −85 17
Putamen_L 93 8.54 −18 11 2
Precentral_L 78 8.49 −48 −4 50
Hippocampus_L 25 7.84 −15 −16 −19
Precentral_R 12 7.67 54 −1 44
(Continued)
TABLE 1 | Continued
Contrast MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Frontal_Mid_2_L 11 7.25 −30 50 11
Insula_R 77 7.20 36 17 2
Putamen_R 16 7.07 24 5 2
Caudate_R 3 6.90 18 23 5
Temporal_Inf_R 9 6.83 48 −67 −28
Cerebellum_6_R 6 6.52 36 −58 −28
Precentral_R 1 6.00 63 8 17
DO > Baseline Occipital_Mid_R 230 10.86 33 −82 11
Cuneus_R 9 15 −94 20
Temporal_Mid_R 8.71 48 −70 2
Supp_Motor_Area_L 503 10.54 0 11 59
Supp_Motor_Area_L 10.52 −6 2 65
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 432 10 −42 32 20
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 9.84 −51 11 2
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 9.78 −42 20 −7
Precentral_L 64 8.51 −48 −7 47
Precentral_R 29 8.31 54 2 44
Insula_L 36 7.53 48 8 −1
Lingual_L 13 7.16 0 −79 −7
Postcentral_L 14 7.01 −60 2 20
Occipital_Mid_L 18 6.76 −39 −70 2
Rolandic_Oper_R 4 6.54 60 8 14
Frontal_Mid_2_L 1 6.25 −36 50 23
Occipital_Sup_L 1 5.99 −9 −97 8
VMW > Baseline Parietal_Sup_R 161 10.91 21 −58 56
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 305 10.90 −6 29 35
Supp_Motor_Area_L 7.41 −9 14 56
Frontal_Sup_2_L 6.89 −18 17 65
Frontal_Mid_2_L 186 10.13 −30 50 14
Frontal_Sup_2_L 7.97 −24 44 35
Parietal_Inf_R 97 8.86 42 −37 47
Temporal_Inf_R 107 8.82 51 −64 −4
Occipital_Mid_R 8.58 36 −82 17
Parietal_Sup_L 37 8.29 −18 −67 59
Parietal_Inf_L 100 8.20 −51 −55 41
Frontal_Inf_Oper_R 111 7.97 57 17 5
Insula_R 7.80 36 14 −1
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_R 6.26 48 20 −7
Frontal_Mid_2_R 66 7.90 30 50 26
Supp_Motor_Area_R 20 7.26 15 20 62
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 148 7.20 −42 17 −7
Insula_L 7.17 −33 17 2
Occipital_Mid_L 4 6.82 −36 −73 5
Cerebellum_Crus1_L 2 6.40 −33 −58 −34
Frontal_Sup_2_R 1 6.10 24 14 65
Frontal_Inf_Tri_R 1 6.07 48 35 −1
Frontal_Sup_2_R 1 5.97 27 47 11
Frontal_Mid_2_R 2 5.97 33 50 14
Multiple peaks in each cluster are presented at p < 0.05 FWE correction. Main
clusters are represented in bold font, with their extent size provided. Sub-clusters
are represented in regular font.
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(F(1,23) = 16.11, p< 0.001) and MO (F(1,23) = 16.72, p< 0.001)
and the %SC in the right ROI was higher in VMW than MS
(F(1,23) = 5.96, p = 0.02).
Contrasts Between Conditions: Dialogality and
Intentionality Dimensions
Contrasts between MS and MO, MO and DO, and VMW and MS
are presented in Table 3, all for p< 0.05, FWE correction, except
for the contrasts between MS and MO (p< 0.001, uncorrected).
Dialogality dimension: voice control in inner speech
The contrasts between MS and MO suggest that covertly using
someone else’s voice (MO) vs. one’s own voice (MS) resulted in an
increased involvement of the right hemisphere (Figures 9A,B).
More specifically, in the MS > MO contrast, greater left
hemisphere recruitment was observed, with activation in left IFG
(BA 45), SFG (BA 8), medial SFG (BA 8, 32), middle cingulate,
postcentral, and superior parietal lobule (BA 7). In MO > MS,
greater right hemisphere involvement was found, with activation
in right IFG (BA 44, 45), SMA, MFG (BA 10) and inferior
parietal lobule (BA 40).
Dialogality dimension: perspective control in inner speech
Perspective switching, from monologal other-voice to dialogal
other-voice was examined through the MO vs. DO contrasts
(Figures 9C,D). In MO > DO, greater activation was observed
in left IFG (BA 44), SMA, and ACC and in DO > MO, we
found a greater recruitment of right IFG (BA 44), MFG (BA
8, 10, 46), SFG (BA 8), as well as bilateral inferior (BA 39, 40)
parietal lobules, precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. This
last contrast indicates an increase in right hemisphere activation
in DO relative to MO.
To quantify the increase in right hemisphere involvement
and relative disengagement of left hemisphere, the %SC values
within a symmetrical left-right set of ROIs were submitted
to an ANOVA crossing the factors hemispheric lateralization
(right, left) and condition (MS, MO, DO). As illustrated
in Figure 10, results showed a main effect of lateralization
(F(1,23) = 55.63, p < 0.001) and a significant lateralization-by-
condition interaction (F(2,46) = 18.63, p < 0.001), indicating
that condition affected hemispheric lateralization. Further tests
showed that %SC values in MS and DO were significantly
different, both for the right (F(1,23) = 17, p < 0.001) and
the left (F(1,23) = 5.08, p = 0.03) hemispheres, with more left
lateralization for MS than DO and more right lateralization
for DO than MS. The difference between MS and MO was
not statistically significant neither for the right (F(1,23) = 0.12,
p = 0.73), nor for the left (F(1,23) = 3.73, p = 0.06) hemispheres.
Intentionality dimension
Switch from intentional to unintentional inner speech was
examined through the MS vs. VMW contrasts (Figures 9E,F),
since the VMW condition, according to participants, contained
verbal episodes. In MS > VMW, greater activation was observed
in left SMA, primary motor, IFG (BA 44, 45, 47), insula,
MTG/STG (BA 21, 22), SMG, ACC, putamen, caudate, and
bilateral PM. In VMW > MS, greater activation was observed
in right inferior parietal (BA 7, 40), precuneus, IFG (BA 47),
SFG (BA 9, 10), MFG (BA 10), insula, ACC, thalamus, left SFG
(BA 6). Some of these activations might reflect the involvement
of the Default Mode Network (DMN, Buckner et al., 2008). In
order to further describe the specificity of the VMW condition
relative to the DMN, the participants were split into two groups
(High-verbal and Low-verbal) based on their amount of reported
verbal episodes during the VMW condition (below and above
the median). A two-sample t-test was used to compare the two
groups on this condition. Compared to Low-verbal, High-verbal
participants did not show any additional activation. However,
the opposite contrast showed that the Low-verbal participants
showed more activation of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
than the High-verbal participants (p < 0.05, FWE corrected), as
detailed in Table 4.
DISCUSSION
Our fMRI protocol allowed us to investigate varieties of inner
speech along dialogality and intentionality dimensions, in the
aim of examining the validity of the neuroanatomical correlates
posited in the ConDialInt model. To explore dialogality, three
controlled inner speech conditions were elicited. This allowed us
to compare monologal inner speech with own and other voices,
probing for prosodic and voice aspects of dialog. The comparison
between monologal and dialogal inner speech (both produced
with other voice), allowed us to reveal aspects specifically
associated with perspective shifting. To explore intentionality,
willful inner speech was compared with mind wandering, during
which verbal activity was reported.
Intentional Monologal Expanded Inner
Speech: The Inner Voice as an Efference
Copy Prediction
Occipital activation in all conditions can be related to the visual
processing required at the beginning of each trial when the
pictures are presented. The pattern of activation observed in the
SP condition (compared with the baseline or in conjunction with
inner speech conditions) was consistent with previous studies
on auditory sentence perception and argues in favor of speech
perception theories that include a premotor component (see e.g.,
Friederici, 2011 for a review).
The contrast between MS and baseline (as well as the
conjunction between MS and SP) indicates that intentional
monologal own voice inner speech was associated with left
hemisphere activation in regions compatible with the predictive
control scheme assumed in the ConDialInt model. The contrast
between MS and baseline reveals prefrontal cortex activation,
in MFG and SFG, regions which have been associated with
cognitive control (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). It has been
suggested that the orbitofrontal cortex plays an inhibitory role
during motor imagery (Jeannerod, 2001). The recruitment of
the orbitofrontal cortex could therefore indicate that inhibitory
processes are engaged, to prevent overt production. More
detailed effective connectivity or sEEG data are needed, however,
to assess whether this orbitofrontal cortex activation does reflect
inhibitory influence on areas involved at the various stages
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FIGURE 6 | Contrasts between each condition and the baseline rendered on a standard 3D brain provided by BSPMview (Spunt, 2016). (A) SP > baseline.
(B) MS > baseline. (C) MO > baseline. (D) DO > baseline. (E) VMW > baseline. All p < 0.05, FWE correction. LH, Left Hemisphere.
of language production. An alternative account, which does
not appeal to inhibitory processes, could be that the highest
processing levels are too weakly activated for the last stage
(motor execution) to be launched. The contrast between MS and
baseline also shows activation in the hippocampus and posterior
MTG, which were presumably related to conceptualization.
The recruitment of IFG can be associated to formulation and
articulatory planning, whereas SMG activation can be related to
phonetic goal integration. The activation of the right cerebellum
is consistent with the recruitment of controller/predictor
models. We can speculate that the phonetic goal issuing from
the SMG was sent to a controller in the right cerebellum,
which converted it into a motor specification. This motor
specification was then coordinated with ongoing motor actions
via the recruitment of left IFG, bilateral SMA and PM cortex,
resulting in motor commands. An efference copy of these
commands could then have been sent to a predictor model
in cerebellum. We have argued above for the role of the
cerebellum in both motor command preparation (controller)
and sensory experience prediction (predictor), with perhaps
a distinction between anterior and posterior lobes. Our data
do not allow us to assess whether this distinctive pattern
of activation occurred, however, given that the field of MR
acquisition provided full coverage of the cerebrum but did
not cover the entire cerebellum. The observed cluster of
activation crossing posterior STG and MTG suggests that
auditory percepts were experienced. The recruitment of the right
cerebellum together with the auditory activation is compatible
with the hypothesis made in the ConDialInt model that the
cerebellar predictor model issues predicted sensory signals
processed by the auditory cortex. More refined connectivity
analyses or neuroimaging data with better temporal resolution
could further test this hypothesis. The ConDialInt model
posits an attenuation mechanism for self-generated auditory
experience relative to externally generated sounds. Our data
are consistent with this hypothesis, since less STG/MTG
activation was observed during MS than SP. In their study
of elicited vs. spontaneous inner speaking, Hurlburt et al.
(2016) even found a deactivation of Heschl’s gyrus during
elicited inner speech compared with the baseline (not only
compared with speech perception). They used a region of
interest (ROI) analysis centered on Heschl’s gyrus, however, and
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TABLE 2 | Conjunction analyses.
Conjunction MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Conjunction between each of the four inner speech conditions and SP
MS and SP Occipital_Mid_R 125 8.24 36 −85 11
Occipital_Sup_R 6.88 24 −91 20
Cuneus_R 6.76 15 −97 14
Lingual_L 72 8.16 0 −79 −1
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 612 8.08 −48 20 17
Precentral_L 77 7.82 −48 −4 50
Temporal_Mid_L 131 7.70 −48 −40 2
Frontal_Sup_2_L 235 7.00 −12 29 53
Frontal_Sup_2_L 6.32 −9 53 35
Supp_Motor_Area_L 6.12 −6 17 59
ParaHippocampal_L 201 6.76 −27 −31 −19
Hippocampus_L 6.70 −21 −16 −16
SupraMarginal_L 30 6.38 −54 −43 23
Temporal_Inf_R 56 6.14 45 −61 −7
Precentral_R 16 5.87 54 −1 44
Occipital_Inf_L 6 4.85 −42 −67 −4
MO and SP Occipital_Mid_R 109 8.11 39 −82 14
Occipital_Sup_R 6.78 24 −91 20
Cuneus_R 5.86 15 −97 14
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 609 8.08 −48 20 17
Lingual_L 59 7.94 0 −79 −4
Precentral_L 77 7.82 −48 −4 50
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 119 6.32 −9 29 53
Supp_Motor_Area_L 6.12 −6 17 59
Supp_Motor_Area_R 6.03 3 5 65
Fusiform_L 38 6.22 −27 −34 −22
Frontal_Sup_2_L 23 6.13 −9 53 35
Precentral_R 19 5.87 54 −1 44
Temporal_Inf_R 40 5.74 45 −61 −7
Hippocampus_L 10 5.66 −18 −16 −16
Insula_R 2 4.96 51 8 −7
Temporal_Mid_L 1 4.78 −48 −40 −1
Occipital_Mid_L 1 4.68 −39 −67 −1
DO and SP Lingual_R 74 8.57 3 −79 −4
Occipital_Mid_R 125 8.24 36 −85 11
Occipital_Sup_R 6.88 24 −91 20
Cuneus_R 6.76 15 −97 14
Precentral_L 68 7.82 −48 −4 50
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 434 7.27 −42 26 5
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 6.77 −45 23 −7
Temporal_Inf_R 57 6.14 45 −61 −7
Supp_Motor_Area_L 90 6.12 −6 17 59
Supp_Motor_Area_R 6.03 3 5 65
Precentral_R 19 5.87 54 −1 44
Insula_R 5 5.54 48 5 −7
Occipital_Inf_L 5 4.85 −42 −67 −4
Frontal_Sup_2_L 1 4.68 −15 35 50
VMW and SP Occipital_Mid_R 74 8.24 36 −85 11
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 325 7.33 −45 26 5
Frontal_Inf_Orb_L 6.98 −42 26 −7
Frontal_Sup_L 183 7 −12 29 53
(Continued)
TABLE 2 | Continued
Conjunction MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Conjunction of all four inner speech conditions (MS, MO, DO, VMW)
Supp_Motor_Area_L 6.12 −6 17 59
Supp_Motor_Area_R 6.03 3 5 65
Temporal_Inf_R 57 6.14 45 −61 −7
Precentral_L 5 4.97 −45 8 47
Precentral_R 3 4.94 51 2 47
Occipital_Inf_L 6 4.85 −42 −67 −4
MS and MO and
DO and VMW
Supp_Motor_Area_R 556 9.86 6 11 65
Supp_Motor_Area_L 8.78 −6 17 47
Cingulum_Mid_L 8.24 −9 17 38
Insula_R 144 8.90 42 11 2
Frontal_Inf_Orb_L 651 8.53 −45 17 −7
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 8.41 −51 11 5
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 6.70 −48 38 2
Occipital_Mid_R 153 8.11 39 −82 14
Temporal_Mid_R 6.52 48 −73 8
Temporal_Inf_R 5.74 45 −61 −7
Precentral_R 10 5.85 51 5 44
Caudate_R 1 4.98 18 8 11
Occipital_Mid_L 6 4.95 −39 −70 −1
Caudate_L 3 4.84 −15 8 8
Caudate_R 1 4.81 15 14 2
Conjunction of all five conditions (MS, MO, DO, VMW, SP)
ISS and ISO and
IMA and VMW
and SP
Occipital_Mid_R 72 8.11 39 −82 14
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 310 7.27 −42 26 5
Frontal_Inf_Orb_L 6.77 −45 23 −7
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 6.52 −51 17 8
Supp_Motor_Area_L 89 6.12 −6 17 59
Supp_Motor_Area_R 6.03 3 5 65
Temporal_Inf_R 40 5.74 45 −61 −7
Precentral_R 3 4.94 51 2 47
Occipital_Mid_L 1 4.68 −39 −67 −1
Conjunction of SP and all inner speech conditions (MS, MO, DO, VMW)
grouped together
4IS and SP Lingual_R 81 8.57 3 −79 −4
Occipital_Mid_R 124 8.24 36 −85 11
Occipital_Sup_R 6.88 24 −91 20
Cuneus_R 6.76 15 −97 14
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 623 8.08 −48 20 17
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 7.98 −51 35 14
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 7.64 −45 29 8
Precentral_L 77 7.82 −48 −4 50
Frontal_Sup_L 235 7.00 −12 29 53
Frontal_Sup_L 6.32 −9 53 35
Supp_Motor_Area_L 6.12 −6 17 59
Temporal_Mid_L 82 6.90 −48 −40 −1
SupraMarginal_L 25 6.79 −51 −43 23
Hippocampus_L 86 6.70 −21 −16 −16
ParaHippocampal_L 6.32 −30 −31 −19
Temporal_Inf_R 57 6.14 45 −61 −7
Precentral_R 19 5.87 54 −1 44
(Continued)
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TABLE 2 | Continued
Conjunction MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Insula_R 6 5.54 48 5 −7
Temporal_Inf_L 11 5.22 −48 −49 −16
Occipital_Inf_L 6 4.85 −42 −67 −4
Multiple peaks in each cluster are presented at p < 0.05 FWE correction. Main
clusters are represented in bold font, with their extent size provided. Sub-clusters
are represented in regular font.
do not report whole-brain analysis results. Agnew et al. (2013)
have observed an anterior-posterior division of activity profiles
within the STG, where anterior fields are suppressed during
(aloud or silent) motor output, whereas posterior fields remain
engaged. It is possible that there was some STG/MTG activation
during intentional inner speech in Hurlburt et al.’s study, but
the restricted ROI analysis may have missed it. Therefore, the
neural network that was observed in the present study supports
the claim that intentional monologal inner speech involves the
inhibited production of motor commands, generated in left
frontal regions. Efference copies of the commands would be
processed by the cerebellar predictor, giving rise to a sensory
experience, the inner voice, albeit a weaker one than during
actual speech perception. The ConDialInt model conjectures that
the predictor should issue both auditory and somatosensory
responses, later integrated into a supramodal representation,
via the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Except in the MS
vs. MO (uncorrected) contrast, we could not observe any
somatosensory activation during any of the intentional tasks.
This could be due to a lack of power, but we cannot conclude
that multisensory representations are indeed at play. The fact
that we did register SMG activation (with a cluster encompassing
the TPJ) is compatible with an integration process after auditory
response, however.
Intentional monologal inner speech with someone else’s
voice (MO) or intentional dialogal inner speech with someone
else’s voice (DO) also resulted in networks of IFG and motor
activations consistent with our predictive account. The lack of
superior temporal gyrus activation can be attributed to the fact
that, during MO and DO, internal models are less accurate
than during MS, and presumably generate more precarious
auditory predictions. This could explain the lesser auditory
cortex activation. This account is supported by the participants’
subjective experience of a fainter voice percept in these more
cognitively demanding conditions (see also Shergill et al., 2001).
Dialogality Dimension: Neural Correlates
of Producing Another Voice
Along the dialogality dimension, covertly using someone else’s
voice (MO) vs. one’s own voice (MS), in a monolog, resulted in
a marginally significant decrease of left hemisphere activation
in the ROIs. More specifically, greater left IFG, postcentral
and superior parietal activation was observed in MS > MO,
whereas greater right IFG and parietal activation was detected
in MO > MS (uncorrected contrasts). In addition, the cerebellar
activation observed in MS was reduced in MO. The MO
condition required a mental shift in fundamental frequency
range, and perhaps even in voice quality, as the avatar’s voice
to be imitated was extremely high-pitched. Some prosodic
fluctuations, and especially those related to affective, emotional
or attitudinal aspects are considered to involve the right
hemisphere, typically the right inferior frontal gyrus (Baum and
Pell, 1999; Lœvenbruck et al., 2005; Pichon and Kell, 2013).
Thus, in the framework of predictive control, the present results
suggest that mentally imitating a high-pitched voice requires to
modify the controller/predictor pair, at least at the articulatory
planning stage. The self-adapted controller/predictor models
that are suspected to involve the right cerebellum in MS are
not adequate, and right frontal region recruitment seems to
take place instead. Participants reported that the MO task was
more difficult than MS. An alternative interpretation could be
that increased cognitive load resulted in the recruitment of
contralateral homologous regions. The fact that MS resulted in
greater left postcentral and superior parietal activation than MO
could suggest that the somatosensory representations evoked
when inner speaking with self-voice are stronger that when a
different voice is used.
When comparing DO relative to MS, our analyses on
the set of frontal, temporal and parietal ROIs (Figure 10),
revealed a significant increase in the recruitment of the right
hemisphere (also observed on the temporal ROI alone, Figure 8)
together with a significant decrease in left hemisphere activation.
Crucially, the DO > MS contrast showed activity in right IFG,
MTG and SMG. Similar right hemisphere activation was found
in Shergill et al.’s (2001) fMRI study, in six participants who
were examined during (first, second and third person) auditory
verbal imagery. Linden et al. (2011) also found significant
right hemisphere activation in fronto-temporal regions during
voluntary auditory imagery. These findings also chime with the
fMRI data obtained by Sommer et al. (2008). They compared
the cerebral activation of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia
while they experienced auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) and
while they produced normal inner speech. They found that the
main difference between the two conditions was lateralization,
with a predominant engagement of the right inferior frontal
region during AVH. An influential account formulates AVH
as inner speech misattributed to an external source due to a
dysfunction in efference copy and predictive control mechanisms
(Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992; Jones and Fernyhough, 2007b; but
see Gallagher, 2004). Rapin et al. (2013, 2016) have argued that
this account leaves several questions open, however. First, with
this rationale, all inner speech should be mistaken as coming
from an external agent, yet patient interviews show that this is
not the case (Larøi and Woodward, 2007; Aleman and Larøi,
2008). Secondly, this model does not describe how “other” voices
are heard, yet patients with schizophrenia often report that they
can precisely identify the voice they hear as being clearly that
of someone they know and as addressing them in the second
person (Hoffman et al., 2011). In our view, AVH does not result
from a disruption in MS but from MO or rather DO. In the
Sommer et al. (2008) study, when patients experienced AVH,
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FIGURE 7 | Conjunctions between each inner speech condition and SP projected on the surface of an inflated standard structural scan. (A) MS and SP. (B) MO and
SP. (C) DO and SP. (D) VMW and SP. (E) (MS, MO, DO, VMW) and SP. All p < 0.05, FWE correction.
FIGURE 8 | Percentage of signal change (%SC) in the temporal ROI including superior and middle temporal gyri, across the five experimental conditions (MS, MO,
DO, VMW, and SP). (A) Left temporal ROI. (B) Right temporal ROI.
right IFG activation occurred, just like when the participants of
the present study imagined the avatar addressing them. The lack
of agency felt by the patients could be due to a fawlty agency
attribution mechanism when other-adapted controller/predictor
models are used. If controller and predictor, for instance, are not
symmetrical or temporally misaligned, then the prediction could
differ from the desired signal. This would make the predicted
auditory experience feel alien, leading to a misattribution to an
external source. This interpretation is consistent with an fMRI
study by Shergill et al. (2000) on eight patients with schizophrenia
who had had experiences of AVH but were in remission at the
time of study. They found that the activation pattern of patients
during inner speech was not different from that of control healthy
subjects, but that attenuated activation was evident in posterior
cerebellar cortex, hippocampi, and lenticular nuclei bilaterally
and the right thalamus, middle and superior temporal cortex,
and left nucleus accumbens, during auditory verbal imagery
(similar to what we refer to here as DO). This implies that in
patients with a history of AVH, auditory verbal imagery (DO),
but not monologal self-voice inner speech (MS), is associated
with an atypical neural activation pattern. This pattern, when
exacerbated in pathological condition, may contribute to the
spurring of AVH.
Dialogality Dimension: Neural Correlates
of Imagining Another Voice Speaking
(Third-Perspective Taking)
To study perspective switching by itself, the contrast between
MS and DO is not adequate, because a change in voice (self-
voice vs. other-voice) is confounded with a change in perspective
(self speaking vs. other speaking). We therefore examined
the contrast between MO and DO, since both conditions
required the generation of another voice. Relative to MO, DO
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TABLE 3 | Contrasts between inner speech conditions.
Contrast MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Contrast between MS and MO
MS > MO Cingulate_Mid_L 221 5.083 −18 −31 38
Postcentral_L 4.660 −27 −43 47
Parietal_Sup_L 4.079 −33 −55 62
Frontal_Sup_2_L 140 4.867 −12 41 38
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 3.870 −3 29 35
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 3.860 −6 41 23
Occipital_Mid_R 12 4.450 30 −88 17
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 17 3.975 −3 62 32
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 9 3.840 −57 20 20
Lingual_L 10 3.585 −18 −58 −4
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 4 3.552 −6 47 50
Occipital_Mid_L 4 3.495 −21 −94 2
Caudate_L 7 3.454 −12 17 11
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 1 3.451 −54 26 26
Fusiform_L 13 3.450 −33 −52 −16
Frontal_Mid_2_L 1 3.423 −42 44 26
Cingulate_Mid_L 5 3.409 0 −7 41
Occipital_Sup_R 3 3.342 27 −76 38
ParaHippocampal_L 10 3.312 −18 −37 −13
Cerebellum_6_R 1 3.285 9 −79 −19
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 1 3.271 −39 23 −10
Temporal_Inf_L 3 3.261 −45 −46 −10
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 3 3.260 −9 26 56
Cerebellum_Crus1_R 1 3.210 45 −58 −28
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 2 3.201 −42 29 −10
Parietal_Sup_R 1 3.198 18 −55 71
MO > MS Putamen_R 163 −4.510 21 2 8
Frontal_Mid_2_R 122 −4.130 36 41 11
Frontal_Inf_Oper_R −3.960 60 14 11
Frontal_Inf_Tri_R −3.370 48 29 8
Frontal_Inf_Tri_R 19 −4.030 33 17 23
Thalamus_R 62 −4.000 15 −19 −1
Pallidum_R −3.790 27 −13 −4
Supp_Motor_Area_R 15 −3.600 9 −4 53
SupraMarginal_R 12 −3.430 63 −25 29
Contrast between MO and DO
MO > DO Supp_Motor_Area_L 134 6.564 −9 17 68
Supp_Motor_Area_L 6.280 −6 20 50
Cingulate_Mid_L 6.170 −6 26 35
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 78 5.878 −33 26 −1
Putamen_L 42 5.614 −21 5 11
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 16 5.437 −51 11 5
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 29 5.424 −54 17 20
Thalamus_L 7 4.906 −6 −13 5
Pallidum_R 4 4.886 9 2 −4
Cingulate_Mid_R 1 4.685 12 23 29
DO > MO Parietal_Inf_R 2083 −7.51 39 −46 41
Cingulate_Mid_R −7.47 15 −40 35
Precuneus_R −7.35 12 −58 41
Frontal_Sup_2_R 187 −7.40 24 23 44
(Continued)
TABLE 3 | Continued
Contrast MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Frontal_Mid_2_R 41 −5.63 45 23 41
Frontal_Mid_2_R 39 −5.63 42 41 5
Frontal_Mid_2_R −4.82 30 47 2
Frontal_Sup_2_R 5 −5.150 24 56 11
Temporal_Mid_R 19 −5.140 57 −52 −1
Frontal_Inf_Tri_R 6 −5.090 33 14 23
Angular_L 7 −4.860 −42 −58 41
Temporal_Mid_R 1 −4.690 51 −43 −7
Contrast between VMW and MS
MS > VMW Fusiform_L 2593 10.155 −33 −43 −22
Calcarine_R 9.765 18 −61 5
Precentral_L 299 8.858 −48 −4 50
Precentral_L 5.110 −33 −19 50
Supp_Motor_Area_L 103 6.670 −3 2 62
Frontal_Inf_Tri_L 172 6.271 −51 35 17
Frontal_Inf_Oper_L 6.229 −45 14 20
Putamen_L 34 5.989 −24 5 11
Frontal_Inf_Orb_2_L 28 5.810 −39 29 −13
Temporal_Mid_L 47 5.793 −48 −40 2
Insula_L 59 5.713 −36 −25 20
Caudate_L 6 5.459 −15 −28 23
Cingulate_Mid_L 6 5.160 −6 14 38
Precentral_R 2 5.096 57 −1 41
Precentral_R 4 5.001 30 −19 71
Insula_L 1 4.821 −36 −4 14
VMW > MS Parietal_Inf_R 2701 −11.720 36 −43 41
Precuneus_R −9.540 12 −67 50
Frontal_Sup_2_R 1749 −9.000 24 56 14
Frontal_Mid_2_R −8.600 39 47 14
Frontal_Mid_2_L 103 −7.100 −30 56 5
Frontal_Sup_2_L 29 −5.890 −27 32 38
Insula_R 32 −5.780 33 14 −10
Cingulate_Ant_R 16 −5.440 9 38 17
Cerebelum_Crus1_L 6 −5.280 −27 −67 −31
Frontal_Sup_Medial_R 10 −5.270 6 59 2
Angular_L 9 −5.270 −51 −58 38
Thalamus_R 3 −5.060 15 −25 11
Frontal_Sup_2_L 9 −4.970 −24 2 53
Frontal_Sup_Medial_R 3 −4.890 6 47 −1
Insula_R 1 −4.790 39 −7 −10
Temporal_Mid_R 2 −4.780 54 −61 2
Multiple peaks in each cluster are presented at p < 0.05 FWE correction (except
for MS vs. MO, p < 0.001 uncorrected). Main clusters are represented in bold font,
with their extent size provided. Sub-clusters are represented in regular font.
additionally recruited the right IFG, MFG, SFG, right superior
and inferior parietal lobules as well as bilateral precuneus and
posterior cingulate cortex. The recruitment of right frontal
region seems therefore even more important in DO than in
MO. As argued above, right frontal activation can be related
to prosody control at the articulatory planning stage, and this
could mean that suprasegmental control is even more demanding
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FIGURE 9 | Contrasts between conditions rendered on a standard 3D brain provided by BSPMview. (A) MS > MO. (B) MO > MS. (C) MO > DO. (D) DO > MO.
(E) MS > VMW. (F) VMW > MS. All p < 0.05, FWE correction, except for MS > MO and MO > MS (p < 0.001, uncorrected).
in DO. It could alternatively suggest that increased cognitive
load in DO, relative to MO, resulted in the recruitment of
contralateral regions homologous to the regions associated with
articulatory planning. The recruitment of right parietal cortex
is consistent with several studies on perspective switching and
imagination of others’ actions. Ruby and Decety (2001) found
that imagining someone perform an action (what they refer
to as third person perspective) involves the inferior parietal
lobule, the precuneus, the posterior cingulate, and the frontopolar
cortex. Tian et al. (2016) have examined the neural correlates of
articulation imagery and hearing imagery. Articulation imagery
consisted in imagining producing a syllable (/ba/ or /ki/) and
can be considered as close to our MS condition. Hearing imagery
consisted in imagining hearing those same syllables, produced by
a (previously introduced) female speaker. The authors did not
report any right parietal activation during hearing imagery. But
their task was aimed at eliciting memory retrieval of previously
heard syllables, and participants were specifically asked to
minimize production. Therefore, the discrepancy between their
results and our own can be explained by the different nature
of the tasks. In their fMRI study of auditory imagery, Linden
et al. (2011) did not find any parietal activation either. The
participants’ task consisted in simply imagining one or several
familiar voices speaking to them for a few seconds. Using a
region of interest analysis, they observed bilateral activation in
the superior temporal sulcus (the voice selective region). In
addition, they found bilateral activation in IFG, SMA, ACC and
cuneus. The lack of parietal activation could also be explained
by the nature of the task, which resembles the hearing imagery
task by Tian et al. (2016). Linden et al. (2011) state that the
most common strategy for participants was to imagine voices
of familiar people, such as family conversations or messages
left on the phone. Therefore, participants may have been more
strongly focusing on memory retrieval rather than actual verbal
production with an allocentric perspective. Alderson-Day et al.
(2016) used a novel fMRI paradigm in which matched scenarios
elicited either monologal (speaking from a single perspective)
or dialogal (dialogs between two people) inner speech. The
contrast between dialogal and monologal inner speech revealed
increased activation in STG bilaterally, left IFG and MFG, left
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FIGURE 10 | Percent signal changes computed on an anatomically defined set of ROIs (inferior frontal and precentral gyri, SMA, superior and middle temporal gyri
as well as inferior and superior parietal cortex), in left and right hemispheres, for the MS, MO, and DO conditions. In these ROIs, from MS to DO, a significant
decrease (∗) is observed in left hemisphere activation associated with a significant increase (∗∗∗) in right hemisphere recruitment.
precuneus, and right posterior cingulate. The observed precuneus
and posterior cingulate activation converges with our results
and those of studies on egocentric and allocentric perspective
handling (see e.g., Ruby and Decety, 2001, or Blanke, 2012 for
a review) and suggests that these regions are critically involved
in perspective switching. Contrary to our own results, however,
there was no increase in right IFG and MTG in dialogal inner
speech compared with monologal inner speech in their study.
The fact that their dialogal condition used several scenarios which
involved different voices (a teacher, a job recruiter, a relative, the
prime minister) whereas our MO and DO conditions involved
one single high-pitched voice, could explain this discrepancy.
The auditory experience related to a single caricatural voice
may be easier to predict than the many sensations associated
with many voices.
Intentionality: Neural Correlates of Verbal
Mind Wandering
Finally, along the intentionality dimension, when compared with
the baseline, VMW displayed greater left hemisphere activation
in SMA, together with bilateral IFG, insula, MFG, SMA, medial
SFG, inferior and superior parietal cortex, precuneus, and left
caudate, thalamus, and cerebellum. The activation of medial
SFG, precuneus, posterior inferior parietal regions and lateral
temporal cortex is compatible with the default mode network.
The addition of the bilateral IFG and insula fits with the verbal
quality of this mind wandering period. When the participants
were split into Low-verbal vs. High-verbal groups, it was found
that, compared with the High-verbal group, the Low-verbal
group showed more activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, classically related to cognitive control (Venkatraman et al.,
2009). This could suggest that for unintentional inner speech to
occur, cognitive control should be turned down. Further data
are required to confirm this result. The contrast between MS
and VMW yielded an increase in right hemisphere involvement
for VMW relative to MS. Increased activation was observed
in left parieto-fronto-temporal regions in MS compared with
VMW, whereas VMW yielded greater activation than MS in
right parieto-fronto-temporal regions, as well as precuneus, ACC,
and thalamus (see also the ROI analysis in temporal regions,
Figure 8). Since an increase in right hemisphere activation was
also observed in DO, this could suggest that the VMW condition
may include periods of monologal as well as dialogal inner
speech. This is consistent with the post-scan questionnaires:
participants reported that they experienced verbal material, and
this could be addressed to them or spoken by them. The occipital
activation decreased in VMW with respect to MS. This is possibly
due to the higher visual stimulation in the latter condition. In
TABLE 4 | Contrasts between the two groups of participants (Low verbal > High
verbal) in the VMW condition (p < 0.05 FWE correction).
Contrast name MNI
coordinates
Region label Extent t-value x y z
Low verbal > High
verbal
Frontal_Sup_Medial_L 16 7.14 0 47 38
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the MS condition, a new picture, with the associated word to
define, was presented every 8 s, whereas in the VMW condition,
a picture was presented only once, for 2 s, at the beginning of
the trial and then the visually neutral rotating clock appeared.
The left STG-MTG activation decreased in VMW compared with
MS, just as it did for MO and DO, presumably reflecting the
fainter auditory percepts in these conditions. Spontaneous inner
speech, i.e., inner speaking episodes during a mind wandering
session, was examined in Hurlburt et al.’s (2016) study cited
above, using a ROI analysis focused on Heschl’s gyrus and
the left IFG. Contrary to our results, compared with baseline,
their spontaneous speech samples yielded increased activation in
Heschl’s gyrus and no difference was observed in the left IFG.
Although our participants were trained to report on spontaneous
inner speech, they did not go through the thorough descriptive
experience sampling and expositional interview process used in
the Hurlburt et al. (2016) study. The five participants in Hurlburt
et al.’s (2016) study had been extensively trained and received
guidance to distinguish between spontaneous inner speaking
(unintentional monologal inner speech) and spontaneous inner
hearing (unintentional dialogal inner speech). Their data only
concerns inner speaking, which was the most frequent of the
spontaneous speech forms. The more limited training underwent
by the participants in our own study probably reduces the validity
of the reports. Yet, the observed left IFG activation during VMW
suggests that participants did produce inner speech, at least in a
semi-expanded form (LIFG is supposed to be already recruited at
the formulation stage). It is somewhat surprising that the left IFG
was not recruited in Hurlburt et al.’s (2016) spontaneous inner
speaking samples. One explanation for the presence of left IFG in
our data and the absence in theirs could lie in the different types of
contrasts used. Whereas we compared the entire VMW condition
with an implicit baseline, Hurlburt et al. (2016) contrasted
spontaneous inner-speaking-dominant with spontaneous not-
inner-speaking-dominant samples. DES samples rarely contain
only one kind of experience, inner speaking may be accompanied
with inner seeing or other phenomena (Hurlburt et al., 2013).
Inner speaking occurrences were carefully selected using the DES
method. Inner-speaking occurrences (20 of all 180 spontaneous
samples, across the five participants) only included samples for
which three interviewers unanimously rated that inner speaking
was the predominant feature of the inner experience. These 20
samples were compared with 85 not-inner-speaking samples that
were unanimously rated as not containing inner speaking. As
acknowledged by the authors, it cannot be excluded that the
absence of significant difference in left IFG activation during
these two sets of samples could be due to a lack of power. The
other difference between our findings and those of Hurlburt
et al. (2016) lies in the pattern of temporal lobe activation.
We have found a gradient of left temporal activation, from
high STG-MTG involvement during SP to minimal activation
during VMW via medium recruitment during MS, whereas
Hurlburt et al. (2016) observe a strong activation in Heschl’s
gyrus during spontaneous inner speech, and a deactivation
during intentional inner speech. The fact that we observed
such a weaker left auditory activation during VMW could be
explained by the variety of inner speech at play. As mentioned,
in Hurlburt et al.’s (2016) study, inner speaking occurrences
were unanimously rated by three interviewers as containing
inner speaking. Presumably, these instances were expanded
forms of inner speech, with full inner production down to the
articulatory planning stage and inner voice prediction. In our
own study, participants reported any verbal material, which may
have included full-fledged inner voice as well as less expanded
forms. We did not select specific instances, but kept instead the
entire VMW session. Some of the verbal forms experienced by
our participants may therefore have been more condensed than
the inner speaking samples selected in Hurlburt et al.’s (2016)
study. Therefore, the reduced left auditory activation observed in
the present study could be a result of higher condensation in the
spontaneous speech observed (as the subjective reports presented
in Figure 5 suggest). We did observe an increase in right temporal
activation during VMW (and DO) relative to MS, however.
This could suggest that VMW included dialogal inner speech
occurrences, be they semi-condensed or expanded. Alternatively,
our finding on the reduction of left temporal activation could be
due to a lack of power and an insufficient number of spontaneous
inner speech fragments, since verbal episodes were only transient
during each VMW trial.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of recent psycholinguistic and neuroimaging
data combined with early introspective descriptions, we have
proposed ConDialInt, a comprehensive neurocognitive model of
inner speech, aiming to account for typical varieties.
We have presented an fMRI study in which we probed
varieties of inner speech along dialogality and intentionality
dimensions, in the aim of examining the neuroanatomical
assumptions of the ConDialInt model. We designed several
carefully controlled tasks specifically fit to compare inner speech
along those two dimensions. The condensation dimension was
also informally tackled.
Our findings support the predictive control hypothesis that
expanded inner speech recruits speech production processes
down to articulatory planning, resulting in a predicted signal, the
inner voice, with auditory qualities. More specifically, the data
are compatible with an account in which a supramodal phonetic
goal, instantiated in the inferior parietal lobule, is presumably
converted into motor commands that are inhibited by cognitive
control signals originating from prefrontal cortex, so that no
movement of the speech apparatus occurs. The specification of
motor commands is supposed to involve a controller model that
may be sustained by the right cerebellum, as well as further
coordination processes handled by the left IFG, insula, and
premotor cortex. An efference copy of the motor commands may
be used by a predictor model supported by the right cerebellum,
giving rise to auditory percepts handled in STG and MTG.
Along the dialogality dimension, covertly using an avatar’s
voice with a high pitch, instead of one’s own voice, during
monologal other-voice inner speech, recruited right hemisphere
homologs of the regions involved in own-voice soliloquy. These
right hemisphere regions are presumably associated with pitch
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control. The lesser cerebellar activation indicates that self-
adapted controller/predictor models are inadequate in such a
task. Changing perspective, from monologuing to imagining
other speaking, was associated with activations in precuneus
and parietal lobules, in addition to the pitch-control regions. In
line with previous studies on imagination of others’ actions or
others’ speech, we suggest that these regions play a crucial role in
first-person and third-person perspective handling.
Finally, along the intentionality dimension, mind wandering
with unintentional inner speech episodes was associated with
bilateral inferior frontal activation and less activation in
left temporal regions than intentional inner speech. This is
coherent with the subjective evanescence quality reported by
the participants and presumably reflects condensation processes.
Whereas the intentional inner speech tasks all implied speech
production down to articulatory planning and generation of an
inner voice, the verbal episodes during the mind wandering trials
were presumably less expanded. Yet the observation of left IFG
activation in this condition does suggest that the initial stages of
speech production were launched.
The ConDialInt model includes informed speculations on
the neural correlates of the conceptualization, formulation and
articulatory planning stages of inner speech. Although our
data are consistent with these propositions, further studies are
needed to test the model more thoroughly and to refine the
descriptions. Several questions are still open. Most notably, we
have made the hypothesis that the phonetic goal, generated from
conceptualization and formulation, is in a supramodal format,
that integrates somatosensory and auditory representations.
We argue that this phonetic goal is formed within the IPL,
before it is sent to the cerebellar controller and later to
prefrontal and premotor regions. This is speculative and more
refined neuroimaging or electrocorticography (EcoG) studies,
with more precise temporal and spatial resolution, should help
better describe the temporal sequence of cerebral activations
between IPL, cerebellum and IFG-PM cortex. We have also
assumed that both controller and predictor models are sustained
by the cerebellum, based on recent findings on the double
representation of the cerebral regions in the anterior and
posterior lobes of the cerebellum. But the present fMRI data do
not cover enough of the cerebellum to assess whether different
parts of the cerebellum were involved. Furthermore, they do not
allow us to test whether the assumed cortico-cerebello-cortical
sequence of activation is appropriate. Our model conjectures
that multisensory responses are the predicted outputs of internal
predictors. Yet we mainly registered an auditory response and
little somatosensory activity. Further studies are necessary to
assess whether somatosensory activation can be detected. We
also speculated that the auditory and somatosensory responses
are integrated (via the TPJ) to form a supramodal response,
comparable to the initial phonetic goal. This too needs to
be better tested, by examining inferior parietal cortex activity
in more detail. Furthermore, we have conjectured that the
prefrontal activation observed is associated with inhibitory
control (suppressing the motor output), as well as with executive
control, related to monitoring one’s inner speech in intentional
instances, and to holding different perspectives in dialogal
varieties. Further studies should help disentangle between these
different types of control. Moreover, we have speculated that the
lack of left auditory cortex responses in the mind wandering
condition was due to our participants producing more condensed
varieties of inner speech during these trials. Unintentional inner
speech is often reported as faint and evanescent, as if its auditory
quality was dimmer or even absent. Given that another study
did find a strong auditory response during spontaneous speech,
further phenomenological and neuroimaging studies are needed
to better describe the degree of expansion during unintentional
inner speech. Whether or not expanded varieties of inner
speech mostly arise during intentional inner speech remains
an open question.
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